Studying corporate texts - critical discourse analysis of Finnish companies' discourses on growth in Russia by Leppänen, Jukka
Studying corporate texts - critical discourse analysis of
Finnish companies' discourses on growth in Russia
Organization and Management
Master's thesis
Jukka Leppänen
2012
Department of Management and International Business
Aalto University
School of Economics
 Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Department of Management and  
International Business 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
29th May 2012 
 
STUDYING CORPORATE TEXTS – CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF FINNISH COMPANIES’  
DISCOURSES ON GROWTH IN RUSSIA 
Objective of the study 
The objective of this study was to find out how Finnish companies justify and legitimize seeking 
growth in Russia, and how they then communicate their performance and future outlook therein. As 
a cross-disciplinary study, it aimed to understand and bring forward the underlying motives of using 
language for the ‘justification’ and ‘naturalization’ of the companies’ activities in Russia. To reach this 
purpose, the thesis combined methods and theories from accounting research, management and 
organization studies, international business studies, business communication and linguistics. 
Methodology 
In order to find the answer to the main research question, a qualitative critical discourse analysis 
methodology was applied on five CEO’s letters to shareholders (years 2007-2011) of five large Finnish 
companies that have established operations in Russia. In the spirit of critical discourse analysis the 
thesis does not see language merely as a conveyer of messages that reflect reality – instead, it views 
language as a force capable of (re-)creating social reality. The study was broken into two parts: first, 
an overall analysis was conducted on the textual material to see which discourses and other phe-
nomena arise from it and, second, these specific discourses and other phenomena were then ana-
lyzed in more detail. 
Key findings 
The study found that top management, having the incentives to do so, frequently engages in self-
serving behavior in their discourses in order to manage the perception the external audience has 
about their company. This behavior manifests itself in the management’s use of language in creating 
a ‘positive discursive reality’ surrounding the company and results from the pressure of shareholders’ 
growth expectations and a simultaneous failure to meet them.  Thus, the management is pressurized 
into presenting their activities in Russia in a positive light and in conjunction with growth even 
though the ‘reality’ may differ from this ‘discursive reality’ communicated by the management.  
Keywords 
Discourse, critical discourse analysis, growth, Russia, performance  
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1 Introduction 
Growth through foreign market expansion has become an increasingly popular strategy (Rasheed 
2005), as domestic markets become saturated and economies around the world globalize. To Finnish 
companies, Russia has for long been a natural next step in the pursuit of growth and larger markets. 
With an average GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent per year from 2001 to 2008, the country’s business 
opportunities grow faster than in the developed economies and, in fact, Russia’s GDP growth has 
been among the fastest in the world (Fey & Shekshnia 2011). However, the attractiveness of the Rus-
sian market is at least to some extent diminished by the fact, that the country’s business environ-
ment is shadowed by significant amounts of risk related to, for example, the weak legitimacy of for-
mal institutions (Puffer & McCarthy 2011) as well as arbitrary policies towards foreign companies 
(Puffer et al. 1998). Considering this, the excessive expansion activities of Finnish companies to Rus-
sia would seem to be guided more by optimism than sound profitable growth strategies based on a 
proper analysis of the market and the weighing of opportunities and risks.  
Publicly listed companies are legally bound to disclosing information about their past performance 
and the current state of their operations. One of the key external communication documents show-
casing this information is the annual report, which is issued after a fiscal year has been closed. Nu-
merical accounting data in the annual report is audited, and therefore should represent a true and 
fair view of the company. However, the same does not apply to accounting discourses – the textual 
sections of the annual report – which are still neither regulated nor audited (Clatworthy & Jones 
2003). These texts, the most read of which is the CEO’s letter to shareholders found in the annual 
report (Tessarolo et al. 2010), include not only information about the company’s previous year’s per-
formance but also reasons for any successes or failures (Staw et al. 1983) as well as expectations for 
the future. 
Considering the unaudited nature of accounting discourses, and the view that discourses have the 
power to (re-)create social reality (see e.g. Jokinen et al. 1993, Fairclough 2005), the CEO’s letter to 
shareholders as an external communications text offers an interesting angle for research. In the 
communication of previous year’s performance and the outlook for future performance, top man-
agement has incentives to present their company in the best possible light (Aerts 2005), which may 
result in excessive impression management activities (Aerts 2001) instead of giving a ‘true and fair 
view’ of the company’s state of operations. Indeed, when communicating the reasons that led to the 
past year’s performance as well as giving an outlook for the future, the management is essentially 
performing a balancing act between self-promotional discourses and the truth. 
4 
 
Keeping the tensions presented above in mind, this thesis aims to gain an in-depth understanding of 
how Finnish companies seeking growth in Russia communicate these expansion activities and their 
results. It is a cross-disciplinary critical discourse analysis of the CEO’s letter to shareholders of five 
Finnish companies that operate in Russia. In the spirit of critical discourse analysis (see e.g. Fair-
clough 2005), this thesis does not see language merely as a conveyer of messages that reflect reality 
– instead, it views language as a force capable of (re-)creating social reality, and therefore aims to 
understand and bring forward the underlying motives of using language for the ‘justification’ and 
‘naturalization’ of the companies’ activities of seeking growth in Russia. Compassing a time span of 
five years (from 2007 to 2011), the thesis combines accounting research, management and organiza-
tion studies, international business studies and business communication as well as linguistics. 
1.1 Purpose and research questions 
Taking the tensions mentioned in the previous chapter into account, it is striking to find that hardly 
any qualitative critical discourse analyses have been conducted in the study of the CEO’s letter to 
shareholders as means of external corporate communications. The most accounts of textual analyses 
on the letter to shareholders have revolved around content analysis (e.g. Staw et al. 1983) or other 
computer-aided quantitative methods, which imply having a more mathematical approach and aim-
ing to make generalizations. However, this thesis aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the Rus-
sian expansion of Finnish companies based on the discourses given by the top management. For this 
purpose, a qualitative, critical discourse analysis approach is most suitable especially considering the 
constitutive nature of language advocated by, for example, Norman Fairclough (2005). The constitu-
tive nature of language is also one of the premises of this thesis. 
In this thesis, I aim to study the question of how Finnish companies justify and legitimize seeking 
growth in Russia, and how they then communicate their performance and future outlook therein. In 
order to find the answer to this key question, I apply a critical discourse analysis methodology on five 
CEO’s letters to shareholders (years 2007-2011) of five large Finnish companies that have established 
operations in Russia. 
The key question in this thesis is divided into sub-questions, each correlating with a more specific 
area of interest and aiming to break down the main research question into smaller, more easily ana-
lyzable pieces. These sub-questions are: 
1. How is the expansion to Russia explained and legitimized?  
2. How do companies justify their performance in their annual report?  
3. How do companies reflect on their future outlook? 
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Since the material to be studied covers a rather large amount of text (a total of 25 CEO’s letters to 
shareholders) it will be impossible to present every single component of each text in detail in this 
thesis without expanding the thesis into a disproportionately large piece of work. Furthermore, pre-
senting every single component to the most detailed level would not serve the purpose of this thesis, 
which is to gain an in-depth understanding of the most important discourses arising from the materi-
al – and not to conduct a quantitative study, in which the number of observations plays a more key 
role. Therefore, I have adopted a two-step process for the analysis of the texts: first, I will conduct an 
overall analysis of the textual material as a whole in order to see what kind of discourses and other 
interesting phenomena arise from it. After the overall analysis has been conducted, I will focus on 
the key discourses of growth and Russia as well as other interesting phenomena and move to the 
second phase of the analysis, which is a closer reading of specific textual passages related to these 
identified discourses. 
1.2 Key concepts 
CEO’s letter to shareholders: One of the most read documents in companies’ external communica-
tions, the letter to shareholders consists of a brief section of the company’s annual report in which 
the CEO discusses last year’s performance and main events, and gives guidance on the future outlook 
(Staw et al. 1983). The letter is targeted at the external audience such as shareholders, industry ana-
lysts and other media representatives (Aerts 2001). 
Critical discourse analysis: An interdisciplinary approach to studying discourses concerned with the 
relations between discourses and other social elements, and aiming to reach a better understanding 
of these complex relations – including how changes in discourse can cause changes in other elements 
(Fairclough 2005). The CDA approach implies having a critical perspective (Vaara & Tienari 2004). 
Discourse: A particular way of representing certain parts or aspects of the (physical, social, psycho-
logical) world; for instance, there are different political discourses (liberal, conservative, social-
democratic etc.) which represent social groups and relations between social groups in a society in 
different ways (Fairclough 2005, p. 925). Discourses encompass language in many forms, including 
but not limited to, text and talk. 
Growth: An increase in the revenues and/or size of the company manifesting itself as a by-product of 
a deliberate process of pursuing increasing profits (Penrose 1959). The term is at times is used syn-
onymously with ‘profits’ in this thesis, for example, when discussing the goal of a company’s invest-
ment program. 
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Impression management: A diverse set of strategic behaviors aimed at controlling others’ perception 
of oneself (Tessarolo et al. 2010, p. 199). 
Self-serving attribution: A particular instance of causal reasoning (Tessarolo et al. 2010), in which 
good news are associated with internal causes such as company strategy or management decisions 
and bad news with external causes such as a difficult business climate, inflation, government policy 
or market prices (Aerts 2001). 
1.3 Structure of this thesis 
In critical discourse analysis context is of specific importance (Leitch & Palmer 2010). In order to un-
derstand the meaning of discourses, one needs to understand the context in which the discourses 
take place (see e.g. Vaara & Tienari 2004). Therefore, I have dedicated a significant amount of space 
to illustrating the theoretical context, in which this thesis positions itself. The thesis starts by discuss-
ing the theme of studying annual reports (or more specifically, the CEO’s letter to shareholders) as a 
means of external communication in the beginning of Chapter 2. Later in the same chapter, the 
‘seeking growth in Russia’ discourse of Finnish companies is presented from a contextual point of 
view. After the theoretical context in terms of studying corporate texts as well as the context of the 
‘growth in Russia’ discourse as a particular instance of contemporary corporate discourses has been 
presented, I will move to discuss the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis as the meth-
od, with which these corporate texts can be studied. Following the overall critical discourse analysis 
methodology, I will move on to present the methodological approach and the group of companies 
studied for this thesis in Chapter 4, which is then followed by the findings of my research (Chapter 5) 
as well as a discussion of their relation to the theoretical frameworks presented earlier. In the end, in 
Chapter 6, I will conclude my findings and present directions for further research. 
2 Studying corporate texts 
In this section, I will present the purpose and usage of annual reports and the CEO’s letter to share-
holders as the company’s most important external communication documents as well as portray the 
context for the discourse of ‘seeking growth in Russia’ as a contemporary prime example of external 
corporate communications. My focus will be on presenting the previous literature on studying the 
CEO’s letter to shareholders, but the rest of the chapter will be devoted for laying the context of 
‘growth in Russia’. The key takeaways from this section will be summarized in the end, in Chapter 
2.3. 
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2.1 Annual reports 
Annual reports, issued each year by corporations as a principal means of communicating with the 
public after the closing of the fiscal year, do not only highlight the financial results for the past year, 
but also provide reasons for any successes or failures (Staw et al. 1983). In particular, the CEO’s letter 
to shareholders included in the annual report typically provides the management’s reasoning for past 
achievements and disappointments, forecasts for the future as well as other important events of the 
year that the management wishes to communicate to the public. 
Even though the economic cycles have shortened and, as a result, quarterly interim reports have 
gained in importance in the companies’ external communications, the annual report still remains the 
primary external communications document of a company, since it sums up a whole fiscal year, and 
gives forecasts for the following year instead of just a quarter. Moreover, when discussing topics 
such as financial performance and growth, a quarter is usually too short of a period in time for mak-
ing conclusions due to short-term fluctuations. Therefore, a year constitutes as a more solid founda-
tion for making observations and conclusions about the company’s performance and growth pro-
spects. As the most read textual section of the annual report (Tessarolo et al. 2010), the CEO’s letter 
to shareholders, thus, provides an optimal target for studying the communications activities of pub-
licly listed companies. 
2.1.1 Accounting discourses in annual reports 
Accounting discourses, meaning the textual explanation of accounting figures, are a relatively new 
phenomenon (Clatworthy & Jones 2003), which started to become more common starting from the 
late 1970s. For publicly listed companies, annual reports are much more focused as a part of a wider 
disclosure process towards institutional investors, market analysts and financial media, with a prima-
ry aim to create a well-informed market environment and a more tolerant, supportive and a predict-
able investor crowd. As a part of this larger investor relations process, the textual parts of annual 
reports have a specific role to play (Aerts 2001), allowing company management to present annual 
performance to users in a readily accessible manner (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). Research suggests 
that such accounting discourses are, indeed, widely used and considered important in the invest-
ment decisions of private and institutional investors (Clatworthy & Jones 2003), as well as an im-
portant part of a company’s external communications. Therefore, it is striking to note that compara-
tively little research has been conducted into the textual sections in annual reports, even despite 
their growing importance. 
The discourses in annual reports will, to a certain extent, be aligned with the published financial 
statement figures (Aerts 2001), and are a medium for placing specific aspects of the company’s per-
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formance within a wider explanatory context: they document a move from purely releasing facts to 
framing and interpreting them (Aerts 2005). In this respect, the CEO’s letter to shareholders is the 
most important document. Even though the CEO’s letters to shareholders as a data source can be 
regarded comparable between companies, their form of presentation varies a great deal (Tessarolo 
et al 2010). Even though the name of the document is the CEO’s letter, the document is the work of a 
team of public relations and communications professionals, which is why it should be interpreted as 
a set of causal explanations presented by many powerful actors in the corporation, including, but not 
limited to, the chief executive officer (Staw et al. 1983). 
As with any other kind of text, the CEO’s letter to shareholders can, and indeed should, be subjected 
to critical discourse analysis. In essence, the letter as an identifiable genre provides an interesting 
study subject because of the function it serves. Accounting data is the primary source of information 
for the interpretation of a company’s performance, but these numbers need to be accompanied by 
some kind of discursive justification – especially in the case of unstable or bad performance since the 
management’s reputation is at stake (Tessarolo et al. 2010). The studying of intra-organizational 
communications explaining or justifying performance would be rather difficult, but the letter to 
shareholders as a source of organizational data is well suited for this purpose (Staw et al. 1983). In-
deed, the letter to shareholders can be taken to represent management’s construal of corporate 
events, and as such believed to reflect informational as well as self-serving tendencies (Aerts 2001). 
2.1.2 Justification of organizational performance 
From the reporting organization’s point of view, one of the main uses for the letter to shareholders is 
justifying organizational performance. Because there are strong norms for organizations to make 
efficient use of resources and to achieve their goals, it can be predicted that organizations will at-
tempt to justify their performance when communicating information about their results, and in that 
process a major role of management is to provide the context and logic behind organizational actions 
and performance so that this data can be properly interpreted (Staw et al. 1983). 
Because of strong societal demands for rationality, organizations seek out and label events as prob-
lems, threats, and opportunities, characterizing their actions as logical responses to these needs 
(Staw et al. 1983). Thus, a large portion of what looks like rational behavior of the organization may 
merely consist of actions that are justified to the organization's employees and managers them-
selves. Some research has even claimed that organizations follow systematic, formal and bureaucrat-
ic procedures not so much to achieve greater results, but to legitimize their actions to critical publics 
(Staw et al. 1983). By this argument, organizations attempt to make their actions logical and defensi-
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ble so as to satisfy societal demands for rational or competent behavior, which can be described as 
behavior that aims to influence and manage the public image of the company. 
Indeed, Staw et al. (1983) were probably the first authors to introduce the management of public 
impressions rationale in analyzing the textual portion of corporate annual reports. Using the impres-
sion management theory that had been previously developed by psychology researchers, Staw 
(1983) argued that both individuals and organizations strive for rational and goal-oriented behavior. 
Nonetheless, their actions generally fall short of these ideals, which motivate them to rationalize or 
justify their course of action. The further the results are from the ideal, the greater the forces that 
drive the justification process (Staw et al. 1983). In general, positive organizational or accounting 
outcomes provide a powerful signal of managerial competence and do not necessarily need further 
explanation to make them consistent with a desired organizational image (Aerts 2005, p. 497). How-
ever, the same does not apply to negative outcomes, which need to be justified and explained. This 
justification and explanation process involves both self-serving attributions as well as an external 
form of justification termed impression management (Tessarolo et al. 2010). The theories of impres-
sion management and self-serving attributions will be discussed in more detail in the following chap-
ters. 
2.1.3 Impression management 
Impression management stands for a diverse set of strategic behaviors aimed at controlling others’ 
perception of oneself (Tessarolo et al. 2010, p. 199). These strategic behaviors imply significant man-
agement of information, so that any positive events are credited to internal sources and negative 
events are blamed on external factors, with the actual performance of a company only influencing 
the amount of each type of information that must be explained (Staw et al 1983). Clatworthy & Jones 
(2003) point out that the annual report has evolved from a financially-driven document to one used 
to construct a corporate image, and is unaudited which makes it an easy subject for impression man-
agement.  
The impression management phenomenon is rooted in human psychological and cognitive processes 
and has been extensively documented in psychology literature (Aerts 2005). In theory, the company’s 
management has incentives to represent their company's performance in the best possible light, 
which may cause selective financial representation (Aerts 2005). Taking credit for positive events and 
eschewing blame for negative events is only one means of positive self-presentation; another mech-
anism is a simple emphasis of positive rather than negative news (Staw et al. 1983). Moreover, when 
bad news is conveyed, companies may try to lessen the impact by presenting any negative infor-
mation early in their reports and moving quickly to more positive events (Staw et al. 1983). In addi-
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tion, companies may engage in a phenomenon called the Pollyanna effect: the phenomenon that 
positive, affirmative words are used more often than negative words, regardless of the corporation’s 
financial performance (Rutherford 2005). Indeed, Tessarolo et al. (2010) point out that companies 
attempt to create a positive corporate image to external stakeholders even when negative perfor-
mance occurs in a clearly favorable external context. 
The fact that management may indulge in impression management behavior in order to influence the 
public’s perception of them may lead to conflicting messages being given in the accounting discours-
es and in the quantitative financial statements (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). Research by Aerts (2005) 
suggests that within a capital market environment, a financial performance downturn constitutes a 
solid cue for impression management, whereas an upturn does not. Indeed, organizational impres-
sion management literature and research stresses the fact that verbal impression management be-
havior typically functions in a reactive mode, as a repair mechanism in response to identity-
threatening predicaments (Aerts 2005). In publicly listed companies, these identity-threatening pre-
dicaments may specifically cause conflicts of interest between the management and the company’s 
shareholders in the sense that shareholders would require the revelation and explanation of negative 
outcomes, whereas the management may necessarily not.  
Although impression management has sometimes been viewed as a substitute for self-justification 
processes, the two mechanisms can be viewed as complementary rather than competing forms of 
rationalization (Staw et al. 1983). Managers may very well understand their financial performance 
and the causal relations leading to it correctly, but nonetheless seek to manage the presentation of 
news through impression management (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). This is a perfectly rational coping 
mechanism, in which managers are adopting an impression management strategy whereby they are 
self-interestedly attempting to influence the perceptions of users (Clatworthy & Jones 2003).  
In summary, research supports the idea that accounting discourses represent one method of impres-
sion management available to company management. In this respect, impression management by 
the managers of companies is consistent with the psychology literature, which demonstrates that 
individuals respond to societal pressures to portray themselves in the best possible light (Clatworthy 
& Jones 2003). However, impression management is just an umbrella term for a set of strategic be-
haviors that can be pulled out of texts by using critical discourse analysis. The next chapter presents a 
more detailed strategic behavior, that previous research has identified from letters to shareholders – 
self-serving attributions. 
2.1.4 Self-serving attributions 
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Attribution is a concept in social psychology referring to how individuals explain causes of behavior 
and events. Essentially, attributions concern self-serving human behavior, since they serve the basic 
psychological human need of presenting oneself in such a way as to gain favorable reactions from 
others (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). The management’s attributional framing of organizational out-
comes within the context of annual report discourses has been studied on several occasions (see 
Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 2001, 2005; Clatworthy & Jones 2003; Tessarolo et al. 2010), and most papers 
have focused on the phenomenon of how self-serving attributions function in an impression man-
agement mode – i.e. how they are used in managing the perceptions that the external audience has 
of the company and its management. 
A self-serving attribution is a particular instance of causal reasoning (Tessarolo et al. 2010), in which 
good news are associated with internal causes such as company strategy or management decisions 
and bad news with external causes such as a difficult business climate, inflation, government policy 
or market prices (Aerts 2001). This reasoning pattern is self-serving in the sense that it is used in ex-
plaining situations to the company’s own advantage by taking credit for positive results and avoiding 
blame for negative outcomes. Several studies have found evidence of self-serving attributions in 
letters to shareholders (see Staw et al. 1983; Aerts 2001, 2005; Tessarolo et al. 2010). Indeed, Clat-
worthy & Jones (2003) found out that statements, in which management takes credit for the firm’s 
good performance, are three times more common than any other causal statements in annual re-
ports. Unsurprisingly, management is also three times more likely to blame the environment for set-
backs (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). Self-serving attributions are prime examples of how attributions 
function in an impression management mode (see Aerts 2001, Clatworthy & Jones 2003, Tessarolo et 
al. 2010), and therefore also constitute the focal point of this thesis. 
According to recent literature, self-serving attributions in annual reports are triggered primarily by 
the company’s financial performance (Aerts 2001); especially negative performance triggers self-
serving attributional behavior since it gives the management a sense of vulnerability creating the 
need to justify and explain the presented bad figures. Therefore, Aerts (2001) concluded that chang-
es in the company’s financial performance should also imply changes in the attributional content of 
its annual report. Even though negative performance is the main trigger for self-serving attributions, 
it is not the only one: Staw et al. (1983) point out that previous stock decline, price volatility and mu-
tual fund ownership may contribute to the feeling of corporate vulnerability and therefore lead to 
the use of self-serving attributions in annual reports – and especially the letters to shareholders. In 
addition to performance-related triggers, the management of the company will want to manage the 
meaning of their financial performance results in a specific way and guide the reader of their annual 
reports to interpret the results in a way that is beneficial for the company’s management. For this 
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purpose, they use self-serving attributions. Although, it should be noted that companies in general 
tend to avoid explicit causal attributions (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). 
Self-serving explanation patterns can be broken down to two components: the assertive and the 
defensive component. The assertive component aims to stress the importance, relevance and scope 
of positive outcomes or actions, whereas the defensive component is used for downplaying the sig-
nificance of negative events (Aerts 2001). Thus, the former component could also be called the ‘posi-
tive’ component, and the latter the ‘negative’.  
Existing research (see Aerts 2001) has identified that the assertive component of self-serving attribu-
tions is the most robust and common instance of attribution in annual reports. In addition to the 
basic form of positive self-serving attribution (taking credit for positive outcomes), several other pos-
itive attributional tactics may take place. Aerts (2005) has identified a discourse practice, where the 
company management enhances positive attributions by portraying positive outcomes in the context 
of a negative external environment, which may lead to an upgrade in the favorability of the positive 
outcome. Moreover, companies may try to highlight alternative organizational outcomes that reflect 
positively on the company in the attempt that the reader of their annual report will consider them 
over an overall negative financial performance when forming their image of the company’s current 
state (Aerts 2005). 
The defensive component, or an attributional excuse, states a negative event or outcome, but denies 
responsibility for it by pointing to external determining factors (Aerts 2005, p. 497). One form of this 
kind of attributional excuse is the ‘in spite of’-statement, where the management states that the 
negative outcome happened in spite of internal actions that in normal circumstances would have led 
to positive results. These ‘internal causality denials’ dissociate the management from negative out-
comes, thus reducing their responsibility for them (Aerts 2005). Justifications are another kind of 
defensive attributional tactic, in which the management implicitly takes responsibility for a negative 
outcome, but at the same time reduces its negative consequences by referring to the outcome as a 
mandatory step in achieving higher goals (Aerts 2005). 
By and large, research on the use of self-serving attributions is based on psychological theories that 
postulate either motivational or informational explanations for this kind of behavior (Tessarolo et al. 
2010). The motivational explanation is commonly associated with attempts to manage the corporate 
image by retrospective rationality and ego-defensive behavior, and observed in situations of unfa-
vorable outcomes (Staw et al. 1983). In short, the motivational explanation means that managers 
deliberately try to take credit for positive results and avoid blame for negative outcomes, which 
would match the functioning of attributions in an impression management mode. On the other hand, 
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the informational explanation is based on either biased or limited internal information processing 
capabilities or other flawed reasoning processes related to the interpretation and recollection of 
events (Tessarolo et al. 2010). Essentially, the informational model claims that people typically intend 
or expect to arrive at favorable outcomes, for example, on the basis of prior experience or cognitive 
beliefs (Aerts 2005). The model is based on the premises of bounded rationality or on attributional 
principles of discounting and augmentation of information (Aerts 2001), therefore stressing the lim-
ited human information processing capabilities in reaching an abstract causal understanding of 
events. Therefore, attributions as explained by the informational model would be either caused by a 
wrong or biased recollection of causal processes, which may be caused by the mere expectation of 
being successful. 
In the organizational and management literature as well as recent research (see e.g. Staw et al. 
1983), self-serving attributions have generally been regarded as an explicit form of impression man-
agement and as purposive, goal-directed behavior (Aerts 2005), which would favor the motivational 
explanation. The research by Aerts (2005) revealed that self-serving attributions, especially when 
manifesting themselves as explicit impression-relevant attributional statements (entitlements, en-
hancements, excuses, causality denials and justifications), are significantly affected by the motiva-
tional model and usually reflect attributional patterns that would be counter-intuitive from an infor-
mational perspective. Clatworthy & Jones (2003) came to the same conclusion and continued that 
self-serving attributions do not accurately reflect the real world, but are instead constructed by man-
agement in their annual report discourses. Core (2001) continued on the same track and concluded 
that it would be too costly to eliminate all manipulation of information from the annual report, which 
means that managers are free to add some bias to discourses at a low personal cost. 
2.2 Growth in Russia as a prime example of corporate discourse 
In general, the Russian market has significant potential due to its large size, fast growth rate and still 
developing market structures. However, operating in the country implies having to deal with the 
arbitrary rule of government officials, corruption and other significant problems. Due to this mix of 
possibilities and problems, companies thinking about expanding to the market are confronted with a 
bi-polar, even contradictory, business environment. Therefore, companies have incentives to present 
the ‘growth in Russia’ discourse in a positive light regardless of the cold reality of the situation. This is 
why this particular discourse provides an interesting studying point into the external discourses of 
Finnish companies. 
In addition, in the current business discourse, growth itself seems to have an intrinsic value for man-
agers, which can be seen in the way how CEOs set strict annual growth targets for their companies 
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and measure them on a frequent basis. Growth targets for the future as well as the company’s per-
formance measured against past growth targets are the main focus of the accounting discourses in 
the annual report, and a very topical prime example among Finnish companies is the discourse of 
pursuing growth in Russia. For the external observer this fixation on growth (and especially the pur-
suit thereof in the neighboring country) may seem difficult to grasp, which is why it is important to 
explain the context for this discourse as well as its underlying motives. 
2.2.1 Growth as the by-product of pursuing increasing profits 
The term growth can have several meanings in business and economics. One of the pioneers in 
growth research, Edith Penrose (1959), approached the duality of growth discourse by explaining 
that ‘growth’ has two different connotations: sometimes, it denotes only an increase in amount, for 
example when speaking about ‘growth in sales’. At other times, growth is used in its primary mean-
ing implying an increase in size or an improvement as a result of a development process, similar to 
biological processes in which an interlinked series of internal changes results in an increase in size as 
well as changes in the characteristics of the growing object (Penrose 1959). In this sense, growth is 
seen as something ‘natural’ or ‘normal’, which occurs in favorable conditions making the increase in 
size becoming a more or less incidental result of the continuous on-going development process. 
However, this kind of ‘natural’ process is not the way growth is seen by top management.  
It is reasonable to assume that the managers who make decisions on behalf of a company are acting 
in the light of a specific purpose. This thesis follows the reasoning of Penrose (1959, p. 23-24), who 
states that the growth of firms can best be explained if we can assume that investment decisions are 
guided by opportunities to make money; in other words that firms are in search of profits. The mo-
tives for searching for an increase in profits are very simple from the company’s point of view: the 
aim is to be able to generate more profits to shareholders. From the managers’ point of view seeking 
increasing profits relate to fulfilling the very same purpose, but their rewards are not necessarily 
aligned with those of the shareholders. Instead, managers may be aiming for prestige, personal satis-
faction, more responsibility and better paid positions as well as a wider scope for their ambitions and 
abilities (Penrose 1959). Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume that the investment deci-
sions in companies are controlled by a desire to increase total long-term profits, with companies 
wanting to expand as fast as they can – investments will be undertaken as long as they yield a posi-
tive return. 
If we accept that profits are a condition for successful growth, and that firms will not undertake any 
growth investments which do not yield a positive return (as such behavior would be damaging for 
the company), then what follows is the conclusion that companies are, in fact, searching increasing 
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profits and growth occurs only as a by-product of this process (Penrose 1959). Keeping this in mind, it 
would seem that the managers’ focus on growth seems somewhat counter-intuitive. However, Pen-
rose (1959, p. 26) points out that since companies will not invest in programs generating negative 
profits, and that companies will never invest outside the firm except eventually to increase the funds 
available for investing in the firm, an increase in the long-run profits of the company becomes equiv-
alent with an increase in the long-run rate of growth. Therefore, the two terms of ‘profits’ and 
‘growth’ can also be used in a interchangeable way when discussing the goals of the investment ac-
tivities of a company. 
2.2.2 Motives for seeking growth in Russia 
In the previous chapter I concluded that companies generate growth as the by-product of seeking 
increasing profits, and that ‘growth’ and ‘profits’ may both be used when discussing the goals of the 
investment activities of a company. However, for simplicity, I have only used one or the other of the-
se two terms in this chapter, even though their meaning is in fact interchangeable. 
The natural first choice for increasing profits would be the company’s own domestic market, but for 
several reasons companies decide to look outside their own playground for new revenue sources.  
Larimo & Huuhka (2007) divide these reasons into two categories: push and pull factors. Push factors 
are (negative) factors in the domestic market that cause the firm to look for opportunities elsewhere, 
and pull factors are (positive) factors in the foreign market that make it tempting to think about ex-
panding to the specific market. Thus, push factors encourage the firm to expand as a result of nega-
tive environmental or company-specific conditions in the home market – for example small size, sat-
uration, and low or declining economic growth (Larimo & Huuhka 2007). Pull factors, on the other 
hand, attract companies to foreign markets, and these include for example the size of the foreign 
market, speed of market growth, underdeveloped and emerging market structure (Larimo & Huuhka 
2007), low prices for land and labor as well as cost and tax benefits of operations in the market (Puff-
er et al. 1998). 
The attractiveness of the Russian market as a target for foreign expansion has increased significantly 
over the past ten years (Larimo & Huuhka 2007), which is no wonder considering that Russia is the 
world’s largest country, and with an average GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent per year from 2001 to 
2008, the country’s business opportunities grow faster than any of the more developed economies 
(Fey & Shekshnia 2011). Compared to other high growth countries, Russia’s household disposable 
income is 30 percent higher than in Brazil, ten times that of India and four times that of China, and its 
population is highly educated especially in math, engineering and science (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). 
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However, evidence shows that the time needed for profitable operations in Russia seems to be long-
er than in the Western European countries (Larimo & Huuhka 2007). 
Although Russia offers great growth potential for foreign companies, there is also an abundance of 
risks associated with doing business there. Since so many companies are (at least analyzing the pos-
sibility of) expanding to Russia, they must perceive that the market’s growth potential outweighs the 
risks – otherwise they would go elsewhere in search of a greater risk-return ratio. In their study of 
internationalizing American companies, Puffer et al. (1998) found out that the vast opportunities for 
sales within the large Russian market far outweighed all other incentives for establishing operations 
there. Larimo & Huuhka (2007) concluded that one main reason for Finnish companies to expand to 
Russia were the push factors related to the relatively small size and low growth rate of their domestic 
markets, which offered only limited growth opportunities for leading companies. In addition, at least 
two different pull factors favoring the expansion to Russia have been identified: high market growth 
and low to moderate levels of competition in some industries (Larimo & Huuhka 2007). Moreover, 
the geographic distance to Russia is short and the cultural distance (using Hofstede’s dimensions of 
culture) only moderate, which adds to the lucrativeness of the market. However, keeping in mind 
Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) concept of psychic distance, I would argue that the differences in lan-
guage, education, business practices and industrial development between Finland and Russia result 
in a larger than moderate cultural distance than Larimo & Huuhka (2007) propose. In order to under-
stand the current Russian business environment and ways to do business in Russia, it is crucial to 
examine how the economy has developed in the recent years. This will be done in the next chapter. 
2.2.3 The context of business in Russia 
Business and management in Russia have undergone substantial change during the past two decades 
as the country has transitioned from the centrally planned Soviet system to a more market-oriented 
economy (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). As the country’s economy is still in the stage of development, it 
provides high potential for growth. Indeed, Fey & Shekshnia (2011) commented, that it is not un-
common to hear business leaders in Russia discussing possible investment opportunities claiming 
that anything less than a 30 percent return is uninteresting. However, the flipside of the coin are the 
high risks associated with doing business in Russia. For many who hear the word Russia, the word risk 
comes to mind rather than the word opportunity (Fey & Shekshnia 2011). Nevertheless, Russia’s 
challenging and difficult to understand business environment can also provide an advantage, since it 
may serve as an entry barrier to those who do not know how to operate effectively in the market – 
essentially providing higher profits to those who do. 
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Traditionally, Russia has been seen merely as a natural resource state bent on using its oil, gas, and 
mineral riches to restore the country’s place in the world and to ensure high levels of economic 
growth (Frye et al. 2009). However, far less attention has been paid to the manufacturing and service 
sectors in the country. The importance of these sectors is already apparent in the Russian employ-
ment data: most Russians do, in fact, work outside the natural resource sectors (Frye et al. 2009), 
which provides companies operating in sectors other than resources a viable reason for expanding to 
Russia. In the past 25 years, Russia has undergone a tremendous upheaval from the relative stability 
that prevailed during the Soviet until the end of Communist rule and the breakup of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. Changes began with President Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (open-
ness) policies of the 1980s (Puffer & McCarthy 2011).  
One of the main results of Gorbachev’s policies and the fall of the Soviet Union was the transition 
from a command to a market economy. This transition brought the need for the creation of a set of 
formal and informal institutions that protect property rights and support market exchange. New 
state agencies needed to be created for performing specific functions that did not exist under the 
command economy. These include governing stock markets and banks, regulating monopolies, col-
lecting taxes and privatizing state-owned assets. In addition, some state agencies that were powerful 
under the command economy, such as the State Planning Agency, needed to be abolished to make 
way for economic liberalization (Frye et al. 2009). 
During the privatization process of the early 1990s, the government’s all-powerful control over the 
economy dissolved with the abandonment of the central planning system, including the dismantling 
of industrial ministries (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). Privatization was an attempt to introduce a new 
formal institution by legitimating private property, which was assumed to be supported by other 
market oriented institutions such as capital markets, regulations on business, and effective law en-
forcement mechanisms and judicial process, all under the umbrella of an effective government (Puff-
er & McCarthy 2011, p. 23). However, instead of leading to a fully-functional market economy, the 
privatization process in Russia brought with it a multitude of problems that even today can be distin-
guished as the main characteristics of the Russian market. What happened was asset stripping and 
outright criminality: managers, and eventually the oligarchs, took control of most enterprises in or-
der to gain personal control over valuable assets (Puffer & McCarthy 2011).  In summary, little posi-
tive has been written about Russia’s privatization process, and studies have concluded that it has 
been the source of many of the country’s enduring economic and governance problems (Puffer & 
McCarthy 2011), leading to many of the problems that can be seen in the current business environ-
ment.   
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Indeed, as a direct result, the Russian business environment, with its persistent weaknesses in the 
legitimacy of formal institutions and the resulting formal institutional void, perpetuates the reliance 
on cultural-cognitive informal institutions in making and implementing business decisions (Puffer & 
McCarthy 2011). The lack of a clear direction and instability has created a volatile environment for 
managers, as have the corrupt law enforcement and judicial systems, weak capital market institu-
tions and poor protection of private property rights (Puffer & McCarthy 2011, p. 23), which are fun-
damental to a market economy. Indeed, in their survey of American companies, Puffer et al. (1998) 
found out that most firms encountered serious problems with government and legislative activities, 
as well as with financial policies and an inadequate financial infrastructure for doing business in Rus-
sia. The vast majority of the experienced issues seem to relate to weak formal institutions. 
In Russia, the government and government agencies hold significant levels of arbitrary power that 
can help or hinder business based purely on how the officials feel that day. The phenomenon can be 
observed in both high and low parts of government: the local fire inspector can be as difficult as a 
federal minister (Fey & Shekshnia 2011). During the current times of constantly changing business 
infrastructures, companies are dependent on municipal, regional and federal officials to create a 
business environment that allows them to prosper (Frye et al. 2009). Unwantedly, the Russian gov-
ernment has more control over the locally operating manufacturing and service sector firms than it 
does for natural resource firms, since the latter operate in a global market with fluctuating prices 
that are largely beyond the control of the Kremlin (Frye et al. 2009). 
In their review of the literature on business-state relations in Russia in the 1990s, Frye et al. (2009) 
have identified three models that emphasize the pathologies of the business-state relationship in 
Russia: the state capture model, and the grabbing hand versus the helping hand models. The state 
capture model claims that the ‘bureaucrats turned businesspeople’ managed to capture the Russian 
state, enrich themselves, and undermine economic development, and fits well for describing the 
oligarch-dominated firms in the privatization and transition efforts of the 1990s. In the Putin years, 
however, the state capture model was turned on its head by researchers claiming that the federal 
government has indeed captured business and can decide which firms will be favored (Frye et al. 
2009). The grabbing hand model envisioned state officials who provided few public goods, failed to 
coordinate their governance strategies (leading to high corruption), remained beyond the reach of 
legal institutions and imposed heavy regulatory burdens on companies. In contrast, the helping hand 
model saw state officials as intimately involved in the promotion of economic activity, providing fa-
vorable policies to some firms, but not others, and having a coordinated governance strategy that led 
to lower overall corruption (Frye et al. 2009). 
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In their own study, Frye et al. (2009) concluded that while the fingerprints of the grabbing hand 
model were still present, there was evidence in support of some aspects of the helping hand model. 
Data from 2007 indicated that regional governments have biased the formal and informal institutions 
toward a specific group of companies that has indicated an intention to direct investment activities 
to the region. In return, these firms were more likely to provide aid and assistance to the regional 
governments than other firms (Frye et al. 2009). Thus, instead of business or state capturing the oth-
er, Russia seems to have taken small steps toward a model of mutuality between business and state 
– i.e. ‘if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours’. In short, these research results indicate a change in 
the business-state relations from 1990s, where strong evidence for the grabbing hand model and 
oligarch firms capturing the state existed. 
However, the change in the business-state relations has not been a one-way street in which regional 
governments would have showered investor firms with benefits without receiving anything in return 
(Frye et al. 2009). In 2007, firms that had invested or had intentions to invest in Russia were signifi-
cantly more likely to report that they had offered various forms of aid to the regional government 
than did non-investor firms (Frye et al. 2009). This indicates that corruption still runs deep in the 
country. Indeed, as Fey & Shekshnia (2011) point out, some estimates put the size of Russia’s corrup-
tion economy at 10 to 15 percent of GDP, which can be considered a conservative estimate since it 
only reflects traditional cash bribes. Frye et al. (2009) found similar issues in their survey, where they 
noted an increase in the perception of corruption and bribery as a problem between the years 2000 
and 2007 at the municipal and regional levels. It is therefore possible and even probable that at least 
some parts of the improvements in business-state relations can be traced back to the increase of 
corruption as a problem. Fey & Shekshnia (2011) comment that Russia is a distinct market with a 
specific set of rules, and that these rules need to be taken into account when operating in Russia. 
Because of the void created by the weak legitimacy of the country’s formal institutions, managers 
and businesses in Russia have had to rely excessively on informal institutions, including personal 
networks, to conduct business (Frye et al. 2009, Fey & Shekshnia 2011, Puffer & McCarthy 2011). 
Most of the informal practices focus on transactions done through social networks or sviazi (connec-
tions), including the use of favors known as blat (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). The use of blat and net-
works can be seen as one of the reasons for the high levels of corruption seen in the Russian business 
and society even today. Moreover, as a direct result of the use of personal networks and lack of for-
mal institutions, trust and credibility have become important components of the Russian business 
culture, with the low level of generalized trust remaining a barrier to the growth of Russian business 
(Puffer & McCarthy 2011). A consequence of the low general level of trust is that foreign firms need 
to spend considerable time and effort building the particularized trust. 
20 
 
In the study of Russian culture through Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, numerous Russian dimen-
sions were found to differ from those of Western developed nations, with some, such as high power 
distance, creating obstacles to successful ventures and operations between Westerners and Russians 
(Fey & Shekshnia 2011, Puffer & McCarthy 2011). The contemporary Russian culture has been devel-
oped during and influenced strongly by the country’s Soviet past, and still shows many cultural traits 
from those periods (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). These include collectivism, paternalism, admiration of 
strong leaders, fear of responsibility, mistrust of outsiders, and reliance on one’s own networks; 
many of which are contrary to internationally accepted ways of doing business. 
Knowledge management, which includes management education and knowledge transfer, is an im-
portant mechanism through which companies in Russia could move beyond ties to the traditional, 
informal cultural-cognitive institutions. The environment in Russian business has dramatically affect-
ed knowledge management, which was either considered unimportant or was managed inadequate-
ly so that relatively little new knowledge was introduced into companies (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). 
In the years following the start of privatization activities in Russia, the failure to develop effective 
corporate governance limited access to financing for most companies, and the potential knowledge 
for developing effective governance never emerged as a result. Additionally, with business strategies 
severely limited due to a focus on survival, new knowledge that might have improved competitive-
ness was generally ignored. The prevalence of knowledge hoarding and hostility toward knowledge 
sharing in Russian firms has been seen as reflecting the country’s traditional attitudes toward exter-
nal knowledge, the economics of knowledge sharing, and individual behavior, all of which impede the 
flow of knowledge (Puffer & McCarthy 2011). The analysis of Puffer & McCarthy (2011) showed that 
the weaknesses in knowledge management stem from one basic source: continuing distrust of for-
mal institutions and reliance on informal institutions based in the country’s traditional culture. Thus, 
the overwhelming influence of the current Russian institutional environment – both the legitimacy 
void of formal institutions and the following reliance on informal institutions – has continued to dom-
inate business in Russia. 
However, it is positive to see that while much of the existing work stresses the difficulty of changing 
the informal rules of the game, Frye et al. (2009) have found evidence of a considerable change in 
the informal institutions over a relatively short period of time. More generally, this change in infor-
mal institutions in a relatively short time would suggest that informal institutions are more mutable 
than many accounts suggest (Frye et al. 2009). This may, in fact, have a positive effect in the condi-
tions for business in Russia and make the country a more attractive target market for foreign opera-
tions by effectively reducing the costs and risks of doing business. However, doing business in Russia 
will still remain a challenging venture for the foreseeable future, since some recent moves by the 
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Russian central government suggests that foreign companies may face new formal and informal hur-
dles such as restrictions on investing in certain industries without presidential approval (Fey & 
Shekshnia 2011). The economic growth potential of the Russian market, however, will continue to 
attract the interest and presence of international companies. Even though doing business in Russia 
creates a lot of challenges, there is also a positive aspect to them: the companies without specialized 
knowledge of how to do business in Russia are unlikely to succeed, which will provide a competitive 
advantage to those who have this knowledge. 
2.3 Summary 
As unaudited documents, the textual sections of annual reports are subject to the management’s 
self-serving agenda and may contain a biased record of the past year’s performance as well as the 
causal relations that led to it (Clatworthy & Jones 2003). Since companies need to justify their organi-
zational performance and provide cues for interpreting accounting information in their annual report 
discourses, literature on studying annual reports suggests that these discourses usually contain a 
variety of impression management behaviors, self-serving attributions being only one behavior in the 
impression management repertoire (Staw et al. 1983). 
Recent literature implies that organizational performance is a significant trigger for impression man-
agement behavior and self-serving attributions. Depending on the study, the main triggers for these 
behaviors were negative performance (Aerts 2001) – which gives the management the sense of vul-
nerability creating the need to justify the bad figures – as well as a general change in performance, 
for better or for worse. These cues should provide a good starting point for finding impression man-
agement behaviors in the letters to shareholders. In addition, Staw et al. (1983) concluded that or-
ganizational performance was not as important a determinant of causal attributions as the specific 
type of news conveyed – so the probability of self-serving attributions should be higher whenever 
negative news is presented. 
The Russian market is bi-polar in nature in the sense that it has an endless amount of possibilities 
due to its vast size, fast growth rate (Puffer et al. 1998) and developing nature (Larimo & Huuhka 
2007), while at the same time preventing companies from operating there due to the weak legitima-
cy and arbitrary power of formal institutions (Puffer & McCarthy 2011), reliance on personal net-
works and informal institutions as well as a lacking (financial) infrastructure for doing business (Frye 
et al. 2009). Considering this, managers have the pressure to portray their expansion activities to 
Russia in a favorable light and present them in the context of growth rather than in the context of 
risks – especially if the performance in the market has not been satisfactory before. However, regula-
tors and shareholders alike expect companies to give a true and fair view of their operations in their 
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accounting discourses. Therefore, due to this balancing act that managers are faced with, the dis-
courses in which companies touch the subject of ‘growth in Russia’ offer an extremely interesting 
studying point for examining the processes and communication choices made underlying these dis-
courses. There is probably no methodology better suited for this kind of study than the critical dis-
course analysis methodology, which will be presented in more detail in the next chapter. 
3 Critical discourse analysis 
Chapter 2 illustrated how managers are inclined to engage in self-serving behavior in their account-
ing discourses – especially related to seeking growth in Russia. However, as stated before, companies 
in general tend to avoid explicit causal attributions (Clatworthy & Jones 2003) and, instead, favor 
implicit expressions. In order to shed light to both implicit and explicit self-serving behavior in the 
companies’ letters to shareholders, I applied the methodology of critical discourse analysis in this 
thesis. The methodology offers a great tool for gaining an in-depth perspective of these behaviors 
due to its critical approach and view of discourses as a force capable of (re-) creating social reality.  
3.1 Background 
Critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA) is a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of discourse, 
and is widely used for analyzing text and talk in organizational studies, humanities and social sciences 
(Vaara & Tienari 2004). In CDA, language is seen as a form of social practice, but there are two 
schools of thought regarding the role of language. The traditional school sees the role of language as 
descriptive, but the more modern school of social constructionism suggests that discourses have the 
capability to (re-)construct social reality (see Jokinen et al. 1993, Fairclough 2005). Indeed, according 
to Norman Fairclough (2005), the pioneer in the field of critical discourse analysis in organizational 
studies, social phenomena are socially constructed in discourses.  
Critical discourse analysis differs from traditional discourse analysis in the sense that it implies adopt-
ing a critical perspective (Vaara & Tienari 2004). CDA may be generally seen as a branch of critical 
scholarship (Leitch & Palmer 2010), and as a methodology it allows us to examine the role discourses 
have in constituting the world we live in. Due to this constructive nature discourses, in fact, (re-
)produce knowledge, culture, identities, subjectivities, and power relationships in social and societal 
settings (Vaara & Tienari 2004, p. 344). Therefore, discourses can be regarded as an important ele-
ment of social practices, which are not, however, reducible to discourse, but rather articulations of 
discourse that contain also non-discursive elements (Fairclough 2005).  
CDA researchers study discourse by placing texts in their context, rather than as isolated objects 
(Leitch & Palmer 2010). Context in this sense is an analytical construct that emerges from specific 
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research questions and seeks to define – in addition to being defined by – the articulation of mo-
ments that is relevant to the constitution of specific kinds of organizational texts (Chouliaraki & Fair-
clough 2010). Context itself is best conceptualized as an epistemic object dialectically arising out of 
the multitude of ways by which CDA problematizes discourse as an instrument of power (Chouliaraki 
& Fairclough 2010). Vaara & Tienari (2004) point out that this kind of context-related research de-
mands the ability to make sense of both the links between specific textual characteristics and related 
discourses as well as the links between the discourses and the corresponding socio-cultural practices.  
Therefore, CDA research tends to favor in-depth analysis of and holistic learning from specific texts 
rather than quantitative measures, such as content analysis (Vaara & Tienari 2004). The concern of 
CDA research is with the relationship and tensions between pre-constructed social structures, prac-
tices, identities, orders of discourse and organizations on the one hand, and processes, actions, 
events on the other (Fairclough 2005, p. 923). Critical discourse analysis is, thus, united by its critical 
lens, which is focused on the ways in which knowledge, subjects, and power relations are produced, 
reproduced, and transformed within discourse, and is operationalized through a variety of methods 
to analyze texts in context. (Leitch & Palmer 2010, p. 1195) 
3.2 Main premises of critical discourse analysis 
Jokinen et al. (1993, p. 17-18) propose a model of five main theoretical assumptions underlying the 
concept of discourse analysis, and Vaara & Tienari (2004, p. 244-245) present a list of four general 
characteristics of critical discourse analysis. Both lists have managed to capture essential parts of 
CDA, but have either repeated similar characteristics in several parts of the list or left out something 
essential. Therefore, I have formed a combination of the similarities and other important aspects of 
these two lists into what I call the six main premises of CDA. The following chapters illustrate these 
premises in more detail. 
The six main premises of CDA: 
1) CDA implies having a critical perspective 
2) Language and discourse have a social constructionist nature 
3) CDA aims at revealing taken-for-granted assumptions and examining power relationships 
4) The researcher is not a neutral observer 
5) Meaning can be determined only in its context 
6) There are parallel systems of meaning that compete against each other 
Adapted from Jokinen et al. (1993) and Vaara & Tienari (2004). 
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As stated by Vaara & Tienari (2004) and Leitch & Palmer (2010), CDA implies having a critical per-
spective. The critical perspective could be dubbed as the underlying principle of CDA, since it is one 
of the key differentiators between CDA and ‘traditional’ discourse analysis. Among other schools in 
critical scholarship, CDA examines and criticizes society and culture, drawing from knowledge across 
social sciences and humanities. Particular facets of critical interest for CDA revolve around reducing 
the entrapment in systems of domination or dependence, expanding the scope of autonomy and 
reducing the scope of domination in a social and societal setting. In practice, this means that lan-
guage is not taken as a given but, instead, is seen as a constitutive force in (re-)creating social reality 
– and the motives behind the use of language in constructing this reality are, in this sense, of great 
importance in critical discourse analysis. 
This critical perspective of CDA stems from a view that Fairclough (2005) calls critical realism. It is a 
particular version of realism that argues that the natural and social worlds differ in the sense that the 
latter is socially constructed, or put in simpler terms, dependent on human action for its existence. 
According to Fairclough (2005), critical realists assume a ‘stratified ontology’, in which structures and 
processes are seen as different strata of social reality with different properties. This ontology draws a 
distinction between the ‘real’, the ‘actual, and the ‘empirical’: the ‘real’ being the domain of struc-
tures with the causal powers related to them; the ‘actual’ the domain of events and processes, and 
the ‘empirical’ the part of the real and the actual that is experienced by social actors (Fairclough 
2005). Since these three aspects are separate from each other, mediating entities are needed in ac-
counting for the relationship between existing structures and construction processes (Fairclough 
2005). These mediating entities are social practices – one of which is discourse. 
The main premise of the social constructionist nature of discourse noted by, among others, Jokinen 
et al. (1993), Vaara & Tienari (2004) and Fairclough (2005) is derived from the modern view of the 
role of language and discourse, in which language and discourse are not seen as descriptive, but ra-
ther as having a social constructionist nature. In this view, language and discourse are seen as social 
practices, which have the power to create, recreate and shape reality (Jokinen et al. 1993). An exam-
ple of this phenomenon was quoted in Fairclough (2005), in which the authors suggested that organi-
zations exist only in so far as their members create them through discourse. Indeed, organizational 
communication has the power to organize people and contribute to the change in and transfor-
mation of organizations. 
Elements of the social sphere, in being socially constructed through discourse, come to incorporate 
particular discourses and discursive elements without being reducible to them (Fairclough 2005). 
Since discourses have a social constructionist quality to them, business organizations should be ana-
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lyzed as partly discursive objects, but at the same time a constant analytical focus should also be kept 
on the relations between discursive and other social elements (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010). The 
key implication of the social constructionist nature of discourse for critical discourse analysis is that 
these social constructions imply a tension between the construction process and existing pre-
structured objects (Fairclough 2005). This tension arises from the fact that discourse as a construct-
ing force can be used both for reinforcing existing objects as well as a force of resistance for challeng-
ing taken-for-granted assumptions and revealing power relationships. These will be addressed in the 
next main premise of CDA. 
The view of CDA as a resource for struggle, as presented in the end of the chapter above, has also 
been highlighted in Norman Fairclough’s work. According to him (Fairclough 2000), CDA asks what 
kind of problems people are facing, what they are doing to respond to these problems, and how can 
these resistances be strengthened and coordinated into a viable alternative. Most interesting for 
CDA is the role of discourse in this struggle: how can discourse be recognized as a key entity without 
exaggerating it? 
Vaara & Tienari (2004, p. 345) continue the point by stating that CDA aims at revealing taken-for-
granted assumptions in social, political and economic spheres, and at examining power relationships 
between various kinds of actors. In short, CDA has the power to make certain things visible, which 
otherwise would often pass unnoticed. Leitch & Palmer (2010) build on the same argument by stat-
ing that CDA as a branch of critical scholarship has a focus on social problems and the power dynam-
ics associated with them, such as systems of domination and instances of resistance. Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough (2010) add that the epistemic interest in CDA research on explicating how these dialectical 
processes and relations are shaped by relations of power, how the dialectics of discourse figures in 
the constitution and consolidation of forms of social life which lead to and perpetuate injustices and 
inequalities and are detrimental to the well-being of many people, and how it figures and might fig-
ure in social movements and struggles for fairer, more democratic, ecologically sustainable forms of 
social life. The nature of these processes and relationships, including their consolidation and effects 
on social life, vary between institutions and organizations, and according to time and place, and it 
needs to be established through analysis (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010). 
Research shows various examples of how seemingly ‘neutral’ and ‘factual’ discourses in fact reinforce 
and legitimize existing social objects (see Vaara & Tienari 2004). Fairclough (2000) provides an excel-
lent example of this phenomenon from the neo-liberal global order discourse: “- - the ‘globalized’ 
world offers unprecedented opportunities for ‘growth’ through intensified ‘competition’, but requir-
ing unfettered ‘free trade’ and the dismantling of ‘state bureaucracy’ and ‘unaffordable’ welfare pro-
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grammes, ‘flexibility’ of labour, ‘transparency’, ‘modernization’, and so forth (Fairclough 2000, p. 
148)”. So, the power of CDA lies in its ability to detect and bring forward these practices and serve as 
a resource for struggle against them. Essentially, this ability may (and indeed will) be extended to 
impression management behaviors in annual reports. 
The importance of researcher reflexivity within the research process is emphasized by all major CDA 
theorists (Leitch & Palmer 2010). Researcher’s reflexivity implies having the understanding that the 
researcher is not a neutral observer, but that his role is to acknowledge a particular kind of critical 
perspective and be fully aware of its implications (Vaara & Tienari 2004).  
In essence, acknowledging this role means at least two things for the CDA researcher. First, as Vaara 
& Tienari (2004) point out, the creation and formulation of research questions is vital. In that pro-
cess, the researcher already acquires a certain perspective and is set to look at discourses in the re-
search material through a specific lens. However, specific care needs to be taken in order to not end 
up with research results that only strengthen the researcher’s existing ideas.  
Alvesson & Kärreman note another issue that the CDA researcher needs to consider. When choosing 
how to limit the amount of text to be studied, researchers are confronted with the issue of rigor ver-
sus significance (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000). Leitch & Palmer (2010) conclude that fewer texts may 
be analyzed in greater detail, but a smaller body of texts means more difficulties in justifying the 
broader significance of the analysis. However, this issue does not relate only to quantity. In critical 
discourse analysis the quality of the studied discourse material is also crucial. If the material provides 
only few cues for critical discourse analysis, and is subject to a large extent to free individual inter-
pretation, the researcher should notice this issue and express it explicitly. 
An emphasis on context is the aspect that distinguishes CDA from traditional linguistics (Leitch & 
Palmer 2010). Context is crucial for CDA due to the fact that discourses and specific discursive prac-
tices are intertwined with other social practices. Therefore, in order to adequately understand dis-
cursive acts and processes, one should also understand the specific social and societal context of the 
situation (Vaara & Tienari 2004). For example, in studies of seeking growth in foreign markets – such 
as this study – the social practices that push the concept forward as well as their possibly problemat-
ic consequences should be analyzed carefully. Moreover, history plays a key role in understanding 
context, since specific texts cannot be properly studied without first understanding the history be-
hind them. Chouliaraki & Fairclough (2010) point out that research questions are the main way of 
focusing down to the aspects of context that are seen relevant for each particular study. 
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As quoted before in this study, context is an analytical construct that emerges from specific research 
questions and seeks to define – in addition to being defined by – the articulation of moments that is 
relevant to the constitution of specific kinds of organizational texts (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010). 
Leitch & Palmer (2010) agree with Chouliaraki & Fairclough (2010) in that context problematizes dis-
course as an instrument of power as well as the taken-for-granted conceptual territories in CDA. In 
their model, Leitch & Palmer define context as consisting of discourse practices, including the pro-
duction, distribution, and interpretation of texts, and social practices, including power and ideology 
(Leitch & Palmer 2010). 
Context is not only crucial for understanding discursive processes but also the only way to determine 
their meaning. The same discourses may be associated with different meanings depending on the 
place, time and setting in which they occur. Building on this concept, Leitch & Palmer (2010) argue 
that these differences in meaning can be explained by looking at the ways context is defined and 
articulated. This variety in the definitions of context within critical discourse analysis research implies 
that researchers should explicitly express the definition of context in use in their research. 
The assumption made by Jokinen et al. (1993, p. 17) of the existence of several parallel and compet-
ing systems of meaning implies that the social reality consists of a multiplicity of possible meanings. 
On one hand, a specific social object can be associated with several different meanings by various 
participants of discourse, and on the other hand one single participant of discourse may give various 
meanings to one social object. The simultaneous existence of at least two potential different mean-
ings indicates that language cannot unambiguously describe reality (Jokinen et al. 1993). 
Therefore, it is important to note that discourses take their final character based on the researcher’s 
interpretations and that they can and should also be defined in relation to other discourses (Jokinen 
et al. 1993, Vaara & Tienari 2004). This phenomenon may be called intertextuality, meaning the links 
between different discourses and texts. As with context, understanding of specific texts cannot be 
achieved unless they can be linked with other texts and discourses. In CDA research, the researcher 
should place specific discursive elements and practices in the text in question in their wider context 
(Vaara & Tienari 2004). Leitch & Palmer (2010) argue that intertextuality, the analysis of both indi-
vidual texts and the relationships between texts, is the attribute through which CDA offers insights 
into social phenomena. Fairclough (2005) touches upon the same issue but calls it the ‘relational 
character of discourse analysis’. This means that CDA is concerned with relations between discourse 
and other social elements, and relations between texts as discursive elements of events and orders 
of discourse as discursive elements of networks of social practices – and, ultimately, languages and 
other semiotic systems as social structures (Fairclough 2005). 
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Different discourses also compete against each other, and the ones that hold the highest place in the 
discourse hierarchy may become obvious ‘shared truths’, thus suffocating weaker discourses (Jok-
inen et al. 1993). Indeed, the order of discourse of a particular organization will include discourses 
which are potentially conflicting alternatives, whose relations are defined in terms of dominance, 
resistance, marginalization, innovation, and so forth (Fairclough 2005). In the next chapter I will illus-
trate the emergence and competition of discourses in more detail. 
3.3 Discourse lifecycle 
Fairclough (2005, see also Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010) has identified four broad sets of research 
issues in CDA which can be addressed specifically by discourse analysts in trans-disciplinary research 
on organizational change. I argue that in addition to being associated with organizational change, 
these four categories also form a so-called discourse lifecycle for specific organizations. The catego-
ries are the emergence, hegemony, recontextualization and operationalization of discourses. 
The emergence of discourses relates to the principle that nothing comes out of nothing, that new 
discourses emerge through reweaving relations between existing discourses (Fairclough 2005). 
Chouliaraki & Fairclough (2010) continue to explain that discourses emerge as particular ways of 
construing particular aspects of the social process that simplify and condense complex realities be-
come relatively recurrent and enduring, and in this process include and focalize certain aspects of 
these complex realities while marginalizing others. The effect of emergent phenomena in social pro-
cesses and texts depend on whether they are incorporated into the strategies of social groups, and 
on the success or failure of competing strategies in hegemonic struggle (Fairclough 2005). Indeed, 
from these emergent discourses some endure longer than others, and are taken up by more people, 
thus achieving varying measures of dominance over others (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010). These 
enduring discourses, when gaining sufficient dominance, may become hegemonic. An example of a 
hegemonic discourse in the contemporary world would be the positive discourse around globaliza-
tion from a capitalist point of view. 
Recontextualization identifies the principles according to which external discourses (and practices) 
are internalized within particular organizations (Fairclough 2005). For example, schools, businesses 
and organizations from various fields have their own distinctive ways of constructing reality, as well 
as internalizing discourses that are ‘external’ to them. Certain discourses become more extensively 
recontextualized than others, for example by being shifted from organizations, institutions and fields 
to others (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010).  
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Achieving a significant measure of dominance may be a precondition for discourses to become re-
contextualized, but that is certainly the case for discourses to become operationalized (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 2010). From a theoretical point of view the operationalization of discourses is a matter of 
dialectical relations between discourse and material reality, and dialectical relations between dis-
courses, genres and styles (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010). Operationalization means ‘putting dis-
courses into practice’, dialectically transforming them into new ways of acting and interacting, new 
identities, and new material realities (Fairclough 2005, Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010). For example, 
organizations may operationalize successful strategies, which are merely discourses to start with. 
Then, these strategies will cease to be imaginary and have an effect on material reality (organization-
al change), workplace genres (ways of interacting communicatively) and styles (discursive facets of 
the identities of employees). 
The discourse lifecycle from a single organization’s point of view consists of these five steps. First, a 
new discourse emerges from a combination of ‘old and new’ discourses, then in the competition of 
discourses some become to dominate others and a few will even reach a stage of hegemony. The 
dominant or hegemonic discourses will eventually be recontextualized, used in a different context, as 
well as put into practice, operationalized. Then, out of the operationalized discourses, something 
new will emerge as a combination of old and new – and we move back to the beginning of the cycle. 
To name an example, strategy discourse in a company could be said to follow this lifecycle. It starts 
out with competing ideas – strategy discourses –, and through competition some discourse(s) will 
become more popular and enduring. Eventually these discourses will be recontextualized to a differ-
ent context, and finally, they will be operationalized and start to have an impact on actual work with-
in the organization. 
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Figure 1: The discourse lifecycle from a single organization’s point of view (adapted from Fairclough 2005 and Chouliaraki 
& Fairclough 2010) 
4 Methodology 
4.1 CDA in this study 
Currently, the majority of discourse analysis studies as well as research regarding annual reports or 
letters to shareholders rely on content analysis and other quantitative measures with very little to 
none in-depth critical discourse analysis studies. This study aims to fill the void by taking an in-depth 
analytical and critical approach into the discursive practices taking place in the letters to sharehold-
ers with a focus on trying to understand how companies communicate their performance and future 
outlook for their Russian operations, and what kind of motives lay behind these means of communi-
cation. Acknowledging the nature of language as a (re-)creator of social reality, and the incentives for 
top management of a company to present themselves in the best possible light, this version of criti-
cal discourse analysis focuses, in particular, on bringing forward the underlying motives of using lan-
guage for the ‘justification and ‘naturalization’ of the companies’ expansion activities to Russia. And 
perhaps the most suitable method as well as object for accomplishing this purpose is to conduct a 
critical discourse analysis on the letter to shareholders – the most read section of the most read ex-
ternal communications document issued by a company. 
Emergence 
Dominance 
Hegemony Recontextualization 
Operationalization 
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Pursuing growth in foreign markets is not an easy subject. It implies entering an unknown market 
with its own specific competitive forces and ways of doing business. Since these endeavors imply 
significant risk and uncertainty in the form of lacking market knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne 1977), 
and since management tends to show self-serving impression management behavior in their ac-
counting discourses, it can be expected that their letters to shareholders contain elements that can 
be brought forward with critical discourse analysis – such as not disclosing negative news. 
The CDA approach taken in this study follows the six main premises of CDA, which were explained in 
detail in chapter 3.2. First, I will apply the critical perspective of CDA and challenge the taken-for-
granted assumption in Finnish growth discourse, where Russia is seen among the natural first choice 
for foreign market expansion. Furthermore, my CDA approach welcomes the school of social con-
structionism suggesting that discourses have the capability to (re-)construct social reality and, thus, I 
will shed light to the growth and Russia-related discourses of the top management which aim to con-
struct a reality that differs from the ‘actual’ and ‘real’ causalities of events. In terms of intertextuality, 
I will reference other texts and events related to the discourses seen in the letters to shareholders 
wherever applicable. And in terms of researcher’s reflexivity, I will explain my position and presuppo-
sitions below as well as in Chapter 4.1. 
The critical discourse analysis approach taken in this thesis should also be explained in terms of the 
position it assumes regarding its level of social interest. An adaptation of Alvesson & Kärreman’s 
(2000) four versions of discourse analysis framework will be used for this purpose. 
Alvesson & Kärreman (2000) categorize discourse analysis approaches into four versions: the micro, 
meso-, Grand and Mega-Discourse approaches. The micro-discourse approach focuses on social 
texts, calling for the detailed study of language in a specific micro-context. The meso-discourse ap-
proach is relatively sensitive to language use in context, but seeks to find broader patterns and go 
beyond the details of the text as well as generalizing to similar local contexts. The Grand Discourse 
approach (note that discourse in these last two categories is spelled with a capital D) represents an 
assembly of discourses, ordered and presented as an integrated frame. A Grand Discourse may con-
stitute organizational reality, for example dominating language use about corporate culture or ideol-
ogy. The Mega-Discourse approach is an idea of a more or less universal connection of discourse 
material. Typically, this approach addresses more or less standardized ways of constituting a certain 
type of phenomenon, e.g. business re-engineering, diversity or globalization. (Alvesson & Kärreman 
2000.) 
Alvesson & Kärreman’s model offer’s a solid way for categorizing discourse analysis approaches, but I 
would argue that the categories are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Leitch & Palmer (2010) have 
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come to the same conclusion and remark that CDA may be interested in macro notions such as pow-
er and domination, but the actual study takes place at the micro level of discourse and social practic-
es. Therefore, to use the terminology of Alvesson & Kärreman, my thesis combines the micro- and 
meso-discourse approaches with Grand Discourses. The actual discourse analysis takes place in both 
of these close-range levels, but I will position and tie them to the dominating language use happen-
ing in the context of Grand Discourses. For a visual illustration, see the figure below.  
In the visual illustration below, the vertical axis represents the discourse analysis approach taken, 
and the horizontal axis represents the view of discourse that the study adopts. This study is strongly 
positioned towards the ‘discourse determination’ end of the axis, which means that it sees discours-
es as having a dialectical character. Fairclough (2005) is a strong advocate for this position, which 
states that CDA is concerned with relations between texts as discursive elements of events and or-
ders of discourse as discursive elements of networks of social practices – and, ultimately, languages 
and other semiotic systems as social structures. Simply put, in this view, discourses are seen to offer 
important clues to other kinds of social practices than pure language use, which stands in stark con-
trast to what ‘discourse autonomy’ advocates believe (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000). In the visual illus-
tration, the two grey ovals and the arrow connecting them represent the position of this study. The 
upper grey oval represents the level, on which the actual discourse analysis takes place, and the low-
er grey oval represents the level of context, to which the research results are tied.  
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Figure 2: Positioning of this thesis in the discourse context (adapted from Alvesson & Kärreman 2000). 
4.2 Research method and process 
The research process of this thesis followed the inductive four-step model for critical discourse anal-
ysis developed by Vaara & Tienari (2004). The four steps are as follows (Vaara & Tienari 2004): 
1. Defining/refining the research questions/interests 
2. Overall analysis of the textual material 
3. Close reading of specific texts 
4. Refining the findings and generalizations 
In this model, the research starts by defining the research questions that are of particular interest to 
the researcher.  This first step – ‘constructing objects of research from research topics’, as Fairclough 
(2005) would call it – is crucial for critical discourse analysis, since it defines the lenses through which 
the researcher views the textual material, as well as charts the focal points for the analysis. However, 
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the research topic itself is not self-explanatory in the sense that it would automatically yield up co-
herent objects of research – instead, specific research questions are needed for this purpose. Indeed, 
the process of constructing them involves selecting theoretical frameworks, perspectives and catego-
ries that affect the very definition of the research topic (Fairclough 2005).  
Then, the process moves on to conduct an overall analysis of the textual material. This overall analy-
sis aims to scratch the surface of the material and see, what kind of discourses and interesting phe-
nomena can be seen. In addition, the approach serves as the basis for selecting the interesting specif-
ic textual sections to be examined in more detail in step 3. Finally, based on the close reading of the-
se specific texts, the findings from the study as well as generalizations that can be made are present-
ed and discussed. These four steps are intertwined by two kinds of interpretation processes: a theo-
retical and an empirical interpretation process. In the theoretical interpretation process, underlying 
theories are used in formulating the empirical approach and pinpointing issues for further examina-
tion. In the empirical interpretation process, the findings are then linked to and contrasted with the 
underlying theories in order to find differences and similarities. For a visual illustration of this pro-
cess, see the figure below. 
 
Figure 3: Research process in this thesis (adapted from Vaara & Tienari 2004) 
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4.3 Companies studied 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the Russian operations of Finnish companies, a suitable 
group of companies needed to be hand-picked from all the possible candidates. As my target group, I 
chose companies that were well-known, large and established in Finland, and that had also been 
subjected to media coverage due to their activities in Russia – for good or for worse. The group was 
chosen from amongst Finnish large-cap companies that were listed in the OMX Helsinki stock ex-
change. Four main criteria were applied in selecting the target companies: (1) they had to be large 
enough from a turnover and market capitalization point of view, (2) they had to have experience of 
expanding to and doing business in Russia, (3) they needed to represent different industries, and (4) 
the target group in total needed to consist of success stories as well as poorer performance from 
operations in Russia. Based on these criteria, I ended up with the following five companies: Fortum, 
Kesko, Nokian Tyres, Stockmann and YIT. 
Fortum, operating in the energy industry, is of significance since the Russian economy revolves 
around oil and other energy sources, and also since the Russian energy assets have recently been 
subjected to privatization activities. This provides an interesting starting point for finding out how the 
company itself sees this development, and how it is able to take part in it. Kesko, operating in the 
retail industry, is the most recent entrant to the Russian market and probably closest to the Russian 
consumers in their everyday choices. Since the company’s main business is characterized by high 
volumes and low margins, and the company has just expanded its operations to Russia in 2005, it is 
interesting to see how they see the development of their possibilities and challenges in the Russian 
market coming from a standpoint of relatively little experience of business in Russia. In contrast, 
Nokian Tyres, Stockmann and YIT, represent companies that have operated in the Russian market for 
a relatively long period in time. Nokian Tyres has had an own production facility in Russia starting 
2005 and the company generates a fourth of its revenues from this neighboring country. Stockmann 
and YIT have both operated in Russia for more than two decades (YIT already in the 1960s), but the 
real reason for including them in the target group lies in the fact that both have recently received 
negative publicity for their Russian operations. Stockmann ran into problems with one of its lessors, 
who cut the power to their department store in Russia forcing them to close down the store. And YIT 
was in the news for the excessive levels of ammonia found in one of their residential constructions in 
September 2011, causing complaints from 40 residents. It is interesting to see whether these activi-
ties have any effect in the way in which the companies communicate matters related to their expan-
sion to Russia. 
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So, the target group of companies studied was selected in pursuit of a balanced and comprehensive 
mix in terms of operating industry, good and poor performance in Russia, media coverage, depend-
ency on the Russian market for revenues and time of entry to the market. Having such variety in the 
group will help in underlining possible differences and similarities between the studied companies 
regarding the communication of their performance and future outlook in Russia. The table below 
summarizes the target companies (including the percentage of their revenues generated in Russia in 
2011), and in the following chapters each company will be introduced in more detail.  
Company Description Entry 
year 
% of revenues 
from Russia 
Fortum Energy company focusing on sustainable energy 
production 
1990s 15 % 
Kesko Retail conglomerate operating in the food, home 
and specialty goods, building and home improve-
ment, and car and machinery trades 
2005 3 %* 
* Russia and  
Belarus 
Nokian Tyres Tire manufacturer facilitating safe transportation in 
northern conditions 
1998 26 % 
Stockmann Retailer with department stores and fashion outlets  1989 16 % 
YIT Building systems and construction service company 1961 7 % 
Table 1: Summary of companies studied 
4.3.1 Fortum 
Fortum is a leading energy company in the Nordic countries, other parts of the Baltic Rim area and 
Russia. The company’s activities cover the generation, distribution and sale of electricity and heat as 
well as the operation and maintenance of power plants. Fortum has a strong focus on sustainable 
energy production: over 91 % of the electricity produced is CO2 free. The company’s turnover in 2011 
was 6.1 billion euros, of which roughly 15 % came from Russia. The predecessor of Fortum, Imatran 
Voima, was founded in 1932. The company currently known as Fortum was formed in 1998 in the 
merger of Imatran Voima and Neste Oy, the latter of which was later divested as a separate listed 
company. 
4.3.2 Kesko Oyj 
Kesko is a trading sector service provider operating in the food, home and specialty goods, building 
and home improvement, and car and machinery trades. Kesko has about 2,000 stores engaged in 
chain operations in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Belarus. The 
turnover of the company in 2011 was 9.5 billion euros, of which a little over 3 % came from Russia 
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and Belarus. Kesko was formed when four regional wholesaling companies that had been founded by 
retailers were merged in October 1940. Kesko as the new company started operating in 1941. 
4.3.3 Nokian Tyres 
Nokian Tyres is a tire manufacturer focusing on products and services that facilitate safe transporta-
tion in northern conditions. The company’s passenger car, truck and heavy-duty machinery tires are 
mainly marketed in areas that have snow, forest and changing seasons that make driving conditions 
demanding. The company has its own plants in Nokia, Finland, and in Vsevolozhsk, Russia. Nokian 
Tyres’ turnover in 2011 totaled roughly 1.5 billion euros, of which about 26 % came from Russia and 
CIS countries. 
The company traces its history to a groundwood pulp mill established in 1865. Car tyre production 
began in 1932 under Suomen Gummitehdas Oy (Finnish Rubber Works Ltd). A three-company merger 
formed the Nokia Corporation in 1967; Nokian Tyres Limited was established in 1988 as a joint ven-
ture company split from the conglomerate. 
4.3.4 Stockmann 
Stockmann, established in 1862, is a Finnish listed company engaged in the retail trade. It has ap-
proximately 45 000 shareholders. The company’s revenue in 2011 was 2 billion euros, over 16 per 
cent of which came from Russia and Ukraine. Stockmann’s three divisions are the Department Store 
Division and the Lindex and Seppälä fashion chains. 
4.3.5 YIT 
YIT Group is a European service company operating in building systems and construction. YIT builds, 
develops and maintains residential buildings, business premises, entire areas and the required infra-
structure in the Nordic countries, Central Europe, Russia and the Baltic countries. In Russia, YIT is one 
of the most significant foreign housing construction companies. The YIT story extends back to 1912 
when Yleinen Insinööritoimisto started out in Finland. The company’s total turnover for 2011 was 4.4 
billion euros with approximately 7 per cent coming from Russia. 
4.4 Material and analysis 
In critical discourse analysis, the researcher has an important role in constructing the objects of re-
search based on specific research interests (see e.g. Fairclough 2005). For me, the process of search-
ing for the research materials started when reading a negative profit warning issued by Stockmann 
due to problems in their activities in Russia. When reading the profit warning, I noticed a mismatch 
between the company’s financial performance and the future outlook regarding their growth poten-
tial in Russia – and saw that this mismatch would make up for an interesting research topic. Digging a 
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little deeper, I noticed that other companies had had to issue negative profit warnings around the 
very same topic. At first, I thought about studying press releases as discursive texts, but due to the 
irregular publishing times of press releases as well as the differences between the format and con-
tent in the press releases of different companies – which results from varying communications prac-
tices and uses for the press releases –, I quickly abandoned the idea. Instead, I turned to another 
publication that was more standard in respect to both the publishing time as well as content: the 
annual report of the company, which is among the most important external communication docu-
ments of a company (Staw et al. 1983). Since annual reports can contain over 100 pages of text, the 
majority of which only loosely linked to the specific discourses of growth and Russia, I decided to 
focus my analysis to the CEO’s letter to shareholders, which is the most read section of the corporate 
annual report (Tessarolo et al. 2010), and usually contains reflections on both of these discourses for 
companies operating in or thinking about expanding to Russia. 
I decided to analyze the letter to shareholders as a discursive text for three specific reasons. First, 
there are only few documents that can be used for studying the communications of companies’ per-
formance and expansion activities to a foreign country – most of which would be internal to the 
company and, thus, classified. By selecting a publicly available text targeted towards the external 
audience, I was able to solve two potentially problematic questions: the questions access to and con-
fidentiality of the studied texts. Both of these questions are important in critical studies, for which 
gaining access to specific companies is, for self-explanatory reasons, difficult (Vaara & Tienari 2004). 
Second, since the annual report is the primary external communications document of a company, 
and the letter to shareholders the most read segment of it, it could be expected that the utmost im-
portant issues for each company are discussed in the specific document. Third, since the text is called 
the ‘CEO’s letter to shareholders’ and signed by the CEO, it could be expected to adopt a more per-
sonal approach to communications. Moreover, the fact that the CEO’s letter is neither regulated nor 
audited (Clatworthy & Jones 2003), provided an interesting possibility to examine, first of all, how 
the top management communicates their expansion activities as well as their performance, and what 
kinds of reasons are given for successes and failures therein.  
In order to see the effect of both favorable and challenging external conditions, I selected the CEO’s 
letters to be studied from a relatively long period in time starting from 2007 and ending at 2011. This 
enabled the analysis of long-term trends and changes in discursive practices as well as annual fluctu-
ations – or lack thereof – based on the company’s past year’s events as well as the external environ-
ment. Based on this relative longevity, I was able to observe trends in both the companies’ future 
outlooks as well as in the way in which annual performance and the reasons leading to it were com-
municated. For a detailed list of the CEO’s letters to shareholders studied, see the table in the ap-
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pendix at the end of this thesis. So, in summary, I had a rather large number of texts as my starting 
target group (five letters to shareholders from five companies, making a total of 25 letters). This was 
a deliberate choice made in attempt to bring in the best of both options in the question Alvesson & 
Kärreman (2000) call the question of rigor versus significance: whether to study more texts with rig-
orous analysis or aim for a holistic in-depth analysis of a few texts. Essentially, I started out with a 
rather large body of texts (closer to the rigor side of the axis), which I then – with my two-part analy-
sis process – narrowed down to specific key discourses and other interesting phenomena, ending up 
close to the significance extreme of the dichotomy. In the end, the majority of my analysis was con-
ducted on the few key discourses, and constituted, in fact, an in-depth analysis of a handful of key 
discourses, as can be seen in Chapter 5. Thus, in the words of Alvesson & Kärreman (2000), I decided 
to go for significance, and do not aim to make any statistical analysis or mathematically valid general-
izations. 
As explained above, I adopted a two-part analysis process, the focus of which was on a few key dis-
courses. First, I conducted an overall analysis on the whole textual material. The aim of this overall 
analysis was to identify the key discourses and other interesting phenomena to be studied in more 
detail as well as contrast the differences and similarities between the five companies studied. Based 
on this overall analysis, I then directed most of my efforts on the key discourses by analyzing them to 
the smallest levels of detail. This was the second part of my analysis, and at this point, I applied the 
critical discourse analysis methodology explained earlier to the textual passages identified in the 
overall analysis stage. This was done with a strict focus on the critical aspect, keeping in mind the 
constitutive nature of discourses to (re-)create social reality (see e.g. Fairclough 2005). Moreover, 
during this detailed analysis process I kept a constant focus on explaining the context in which the 
discourses take place, which is a key aspect of critical discourse analysis (Leitch & Palmer 2010). In 
accordance with the third main premise of critical discourse analysis explained in Chapter 3, I set out 
to reveal taken-for-granted assumptions such as the discourse of seeking ‘profitable growth’ in Rus-
sia. 
4.5 Reliability and validity 
In qualitative research, the research results are more or less dependent on the subjective choices 
made by the researcher – such as formulating the research questions. Therefore, evaluating the reli-
ability relates mainly to evaluating the reliability of the research process. I have described my re-
search process openly and transparently in order to make it clear for the reader to follow the re-
search steps which resulted to the conclusions made from this study. To maximize the level of trans-
parency and sharpen my analysis, I have presented the reader with direct quotes from my research 
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material. Moreover, my research is based on public material, which is accessible to all. Since the re-
searcher’s reflexivity and subjective role has been recognized as important in critical discourse analy-
sis (Leitch & Palmer 2010), basing the research on public material will avoid the danger of bias in 
creating the materials – which is possible when, for example, conducting an interview and creating 
questions for it. Since this thesis is based on public material, readers have the possibility to compare 
their findings to my interpretations and, if needed, the whole research can be replicated. I believe 
that the results obtained by replicating this study (even at a later point in time) would not significant-
ly differ from the ones presented in this thesis. In various phases of my research process, I have 
made important subjective choices, which I have strived to explain to the reader. The most important 
of these choices have been the selection of target companies and years for the study as well as the 
grouping of the topics found in my thesis into various themes. 
In critical discourse analysis, similarly to other streams of qualitative research, sample size is not a 
prerequisite for the success of the study. Rather, a smaller sample size enables more depth in the 
analysis. Therefore, instead of focusing on a large number of textual materials, I will aim my efforts 
towards a more profound analysis of the specific texts selected for this study. Although the target 
group of firms is relatively small (five companies, five texts per company), describing the whole re-
search material in detail in this study is not possible. However, in order to be as transparent as possi-
ble regarding the material studied and my interpretations thereof, I have analyze the textual material 
first as a whole, and then focused on the most interesting parts and perceptions in more detail. In 
this process, I have strived to capture all the parts that are relevant from the viewpoint of my re-
search questions. However, this relevance is based purely on my own interpretation, and another 
researcher might understand the studied material in a slightly different light. This interpretative na-
ture is built in to the methodology of critical discourse analysis, since the same texts can be under-
stood in a different light (see e.g. Fairclough 2005, Leitch & Palmer 2010). Because the results of a 
critical discourse analysis are based on the interpretations of the researcher, it is important for the 
researcher to explicitly express their interpretations and the cues leading to them carefully. This is 
what I have aimed to do throughout my thesis. 
Prior to this I have brought forward the literature related to foreign expansion activities and business 
in Russia as well as presented theories for conducting critical discourse analysis and studying annual 
reports as texts. Moreover, I have presented my research methodology and textual material, and 
evaluated the reliability of my research. In the next chapter I will move forward to analyze the re-
search material from the viewpoint of my research questions. 
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5 Letter to shareholders as a means of external communication 
The letter to shareholders is the most read section of a company’s annual report (Tessarolo et al. 
2010), in which the CEO provides general information to the company’s external audience including, 
but not limited to, a summary of the company’s last year’s performance, main events of the year and 
a future outlook. The letter is fairly brief with only about 1-4 pages of text, and it is used as one of 
the primary communication documents targeted towards the external audience. As the name of the 
letter implies, the main target audience for the letter are the company’s current shareholders. In 
addition, other external groups such as industry analysts, possible investors and other media repre-
sentatives have significant interest in the information provided in the letters. 
In this chapter, I will first focus on a general analysis of the textual material by assessing the tone and 
style of the letters to shareholders as well as presenting an overview of the key discourses found in 
the letters. Then, I will move on to a more detailed analysis by focusing on the key discourses that 
are most important for the research questions of this thesis. These discourses include performance 
(as the result of past efforts to seek growth), growth, Russia and the future. This detailed analysis 
revolves around how the studied companies communicate, justify and legitimize their financial per-
formance, growth prospects, future outlook and expansion to Russia, and aims to answer the re-
search questions posed in Chapter 1.1. 
5.1 Style and tone of the letter 
Most of the letters to shareholders followed a magazine-style letter-like text format consistent with 
the other textual sections of the annual reports. The Nokian Tyres’ letters bore the most resem-
blance to traditional letters beginning with a ‘Dear Reader,’-greeting and ending in a thank you and 
the CEO’s signature. In addition, the Nokian Tyres and Stockmann letters were more personal also 
regarding their textual style with versatile, warm and colorful expressions and management’s own 
comments and views, whereas Fortum, Kesko and YIT relied more on presenting facts in a ‘neutral’ 
manner. Thus, it would seem that the two smallest companies had the most personal communication 
styles in their letters. In contrast to the traditional letter-like format seen in the Nokian Tyres’ letters, 
Fortum had ‘interview with the CEO’ starting in 2008. This presentational change did not, however, 
have any effect on the actual content of the letter – only the format changed. Similarly to the key 
discourses of the letter discussed in the previous chapter, the styles did also not change significantly 
over time, apart from Fortum’s shift to an interview format. 
Almost all of the letters to shareholders included a studio-quality picture of the CEO in a casual pos-
ture. Since the document is supposedly a letter from the CEO to the general audience, this can gen-
erally be expected. Adding a picture of the CEO could be an attempt at making the letter seem more 
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‘personal’ and at painting a picture of a more approachable and down-to-earth CEO, which would 
then bring the company closer to the ‘common man’ reading the document. However, the practice of 
including a casual picture of the CEO can also be questioned, since it is a well-known fact that com-
panies have entire PR and communications departments working on these letters, rather than having 
the CEOs themselves doing all the writing. This is backed by the observation that a change in the 
company’s CEO did not trigger a change in the style and content of the letter to shareholders (com-
pare, for example, YIT years 2007 and 2008 as well as Fortum 2008 and 2009). 
In terms of style, the letters to shareholders could roughly be divided into two categories. The first 
would be a ‘seemingly neutral’ description of past year’s events, and the second comes closer to a 
marketing letter. The two style categories are at least to some extent linked with the key discourses 
in the letters to shareholders: whenever customer satisfaction, products & services, employees or 
corporate culture were included in the key discourses, the style drifted towards marketing. Excerpt 
(1) below illustrates the marketing-oriented style. 
(1) In Kesko and K-stores, responsibility is part of our daily activities. Customers can rely on 
the fact that their responsible choices start when they enter a K-Group store. Responsible 
activities are concrete actions that, for example, improve energy efficiency, reduce the 
amount of waste, offer a safe product range and improve wellbeing at work and working 
conditions. Kesko's and K-stores' duties include helping customers make choices that are 
good for their wellbeing and for the environment. (Kesko 2011, p. 7). 
The content of the marketing-oriented segments of the letters to shareholders share several com-
mon traits: they are usually only loosely linked to the year’s events of the company, and include a 
‘company presentation’ from the capability or product and service point of view. In sharp contrast to 
this, the ‘seemingly neutral’ passages of the letters to shareholders usually revolve around company 
finances or regular events of the past year. Excerpt (2) below highlights an example of this style. 
(2) In the Energy Package published in January 2007, the EU made a commitment to find a 
solution for combining European competitiveness with sustainability and security of sup-
ply. In practice the EU is now committed to cutting CO2 emissions by 20%, increasing the 
share of renewable resources by 20%, and increasing energy efficiency by 20% by the 
year 2020. It goes without saying that the challenge is huge, considering that during the 
same period up to 1,300 TWh of new production is needed. To reach these goals with the 
lowest cost, a well-functioning and efficient market is crucial. Since cooperation between 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) is widely seen as a precondition for development 
of the integration, the Energy Package prompted a discussion around TSO unbundling. 
Finally, in September, the commission came out with the Internal Energy Market Pack-
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age. Key proposals were full ownership unbundling of TSOs or, alternatively, setting up 
Independent System Operators (ISOs); the establishment of bodies for cooperation for 
the regulators and the TSOs; and creation of regional retail markets. (Fortum 2007, p. 6-
7). 
Since the research sample covers a period of five years consisting of both good and bad years in 
terms of the economic situation, at least some fluctuation in the tone of the letter could be ex-
pected. It would seem intuitive that the tone would follow economic trends or last year’s perfor-
mance in the sense that a year of good or improving performance would be conveyed through a pos-
itive letter, whereas a year of poor or declining performance would imply a more serious (or, to some 
extent, negative) tone. However, the research observations did not back this assumption: the tone of 
the letter to shareholders was positive for all companies during all years – even in times of poor or 
declining performance.  
The (sometimes overly) positive tone of the letters can be explained at least partially by the fact that 
the document is meant for investors, analysts and public media, and therefore should convey an 
image of the company as an attractive investment, service provider or employer. However, account-
ing practices state that companies should give a true and fair view of their operations in the annual 
reports – a guideline, which is not only limited to the numerical sections, but should also apply to the 
annual report discourses. As can be seen from the overly positive tone of the letters to shareholders, 
this does not hold true. From an investor’s point of view, knowing when the company is not doing 
well – and will not be doing well in the future – is a key piece of information, which apparently can-
not be obtained from the company itself. And, as a result, this missing piece of information can prove 
to be rather costly to investors, as can be seen from the case of Nokia (outside the scope of this the-
sis), who without exception has posted positive letters to shareholders since the year 2000, but 
whose share price has since dropped from 65 EUR per share to about 2.2 EUR in May 2012. There-
fore, one would hope that even though the management has self-serving interests to show their 
company in the best possible light, they would still reflect their situation truthfully in the letters to 
shareholders. 
Since the letters to shareholders are unaudited documents (Clatworthy & Jones 2003), they are easy 
targets for impression management activities – and such activities do, in fact, occur rather frequent-
ly. Next, I will present an overview of the key discourses that were found in the letters to sharehold-
ers and then move on to examine some of the arising discourses in more detail. 
5.2 Key discourses 
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As could be expected, the letters to shareholders in the Finnish companies’ annual reports revolved 
around the main events of the reporting year. The letters consisted of a relatively consistent set of 
recurring key discourses which were discussed almost every year over the five-year period studied. In 
addition, certain non-recurring events from each year were presented most likely to complement the 
‘standard’ discourses with other topical issues. The key discourses across the companies studied 
were relatively similar, with some appearing in all of the studied letters for all companies, whereas 
others clearly reflected communication strategy choices of each company. A summary of the dis-
courses found is presented in the table below, in which all the non-recurring events from the year fall 
into the category “Other year’s events”. A discourse was considered recurring if it was present in at 
least two of the five annual reports. 
 
Figure 4: Recurring key discourse matrix 
Unsurprisingly, the company’s financial performance, the external operating environment, future 
outlook for the next year and other non-recurring events from the current year were discussed in all 
letters to shareholders of all the companies studied. Sustainability seemed to be a main divider for 
the companies studied: it was either extremely important to a company and discussed in detail or it 
was not discussed at all – there was no middle ground. This seems to reflect the general trends and 
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attitudes toward sustainability in society, where companies and individuals alike tend to either focus 
strongly on sustainable behavior or abide to the bare minimum stated in the legislation. 
As can be seen from the figure above, customer satisfaction was a key discourse for Kesko, but not so 
much for other studied companies. However, this does not imply that other companies would not 
care for the satisfaction and loyalty of their customers. Instead, they decided to discuss it elsewhere 
in their annual reports. Similarly to customer satisfaction, employees were discussed explicitly only at 
Kesko and YIT. However, this does not necessarily reflect the relative importance of employees in the 
studied companies. Since the letter to shareholders is probably one of the most read documents 
directed at the general external audience, including the employee discourse is more of a strategic 
choice of communication with the possible aim of presenting the company as an ‘employee-friendly’ 
enterprise in the hope that prospective future employees read the letter to shareholders.. As a curi-
osity it is worth mentioning that even though Nokian Tyres rarely discusses employees, in three out 
of five annual reports they mention the corporate culture – their internal ‘Hakkapeliitta spirit’ –, 
which can be seen as a rather similar strategic choice of discursive focus. 
Moreover, strategic communication choices can be seen in the way, in which some companies dis-
cuss their own products and services. In a very clear attempt at marketing, Kesko highlights their own 
brands in all letters, YIT focuses on promoting their sustainable low-energy homes and high-
technology monitoring services, and Nokian Tyres has always space for mentioning how their range 
of tires has once again placed first in car magazine tests. In sharp contrast, Stockmann never discuss-
es their products or services, and Fortum does that to a rather small extent. Whether these market-
ing attempts are directed towards convincing investors and analysts of a superior service offering or 
towards getting the end consumers to spend more is, however, unclear. 
Policies and legislation were only discussed when they were of extreme importance to the company. 
Fortum as a publicly listed, but partially state-owned, and highly regulated energy producer is due to 
its ownership structure and operating industry almost required to discuss energy politics and legisla-
tion. Other companies decided to discuss legislation only when it was causing them harm. Stockmann 
discussed the extensive bureaucracy, unlawful activities and low power of formal institutions to en-
force court decisions, when these events caused delays in opening Russian department stores or 
even led to the closing down of the Smolenskaya department store (see Stockmann 2008). In a simi-
lar manner, Kesko discussed legislation around the Finnish VAT increase on 1st of July 2010. 
The most important observations from the key discourses are highlighted in red color in the figure 
above. They revolve around two main findings. First, growth discourse was abandoned at Fortum 
during harder times, i.e. around the financial crisis in the 2008 and 2009 letters to shareholders, and 
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at Kesko in their 2008 letter. Intertwined with this phenomenon, Kesko also discarded any discourses 
revolving around Russia in 2008. Other companies still discussed their growth prospects during the 
financial crisis, but decided to note that the prospects have to be lowered. This may be due to the 
fact that companies do not like to disclose bad news or share negative prospects, which is why some 
companies may have decided not to talk about negative issues (lowering growth prospects) at all.  
However, a more likely explanation is one provided by Aerts (2005), in which he presented the con-
cept of ‘selective representation’, meaning a strategic choice of communication, in which the com-
panies either emphasize positive aspects in conjunction with negative news, or decide not to include 
negative discourses in their communication at all. It would seem that leaving out growth and Russia 
discourses during more difficult times is a sign of the latter, in which the companies deliberately 
abandon the ‘growth in Russia’ discourse when there is nothing positive to report about it. Some-
what elated to the phenomenon of not disclosing negative information, during tougher years (2008, 
2009) all other companies discussed streamlining their operations except for Fortum. This may be 
either due to the company being in such a good condition that it did not have to streamline their 
operations, or due to the strategic choice of not including negative-toned discourses in order to pre-
sent the company in a more positive light.  
The non-recurring events of the year included topical internal and external issues for each company 
such as the company turning 70 years old (see Kesko 2010), and the Fukushima nuclear accident and 
preparation for other natural phenomena such as storms (see Fortum 2011). 
In summary, the key discourses seemed to stay relatively consistent from year to year, reflecting on 
the most important parts of business that are of significance to the companies and their external 
audiences: performance, growth, external environment and other non-recurring events of the year. 
Therefore, from a thematic point of view, the letters to shareholders will seem rather credible, since 
nothing crucial is missing. However, some of the discourses do not reflect issues of significance, but 
rather have been included in the letters to shareholders as a choice of communication strategy – 
perhaps based on a self-serving agenda. These include discourses such as company presentations, 
describing the products and services of the company, discussing the company’s employees and cus-
tomer satisfaction. From the external audience’s point of view, these discourses seem to be included 
to fill blank space and may have been added to the letters to shareholders merely to say something 
positive – in case the company’s performance or future outlook does not give enough grounds to do 
so.  
Essentially, these additional pieces of information can be regarded as ‘background noise’ making it 
difficult for the readers of the letter to shareholders to identify essential information from between 
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this noise. Therefore, the external audience would, in fact, be better off if this information was 
placed elsewhere in the annual report. An astonishing fact is, that that is the case: the company 
presentations as well as descriptions of employees and products can be found elsewhere in the an-
nual report, usually even before the letter to shareholders. Thus, it would seem like a deliberate 
choice of communication strategy and like one behavioral pattern in the impression management 
repertoire, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
5.3 Performance 
The company’s (financial) performance constitutes one of the main key discourses in the letter to 
shareholders, and is also the one, which is presented in the most versatile ways. The importance of 
the presentation and justification of the company’s performance and any aspects that may have in-
fluenced it is understandable considering the interests of the target audience of the letter. It also 
represents the result of past growth investments, and therefore is directly linked to the discourses of 
growth and Russia. 
The communication of financial performance consists of two components: the first is numerical ac-
counting data, which presents the performance in terms of absolute numbers and differences to 
previous years or quarters. On the surface, the accounting data seems rather self-evident: after all, 
numbers are audited and subject to a set of regulations. However, since accounting practices, busi-
ness models and industries vary across companies, there is more than meets the eye behind the 
numbers. For that purpose, companies back the accounting data with performance discourses – the 
explanation and justification of their financial performance – which aim at explaining how the com-
pany has ended up with the presented numbers and in which context they should be interpreted. 
Even though the performance discourses relate to audited accounting figures, they are unaudited 
and thus subject to the management’s efforts to manage the interpretation of the accounting figures 
in a self-serving manner. Unsurprisingly, as will be presented later in this chapter, these self-serving 
practices were rather common in the performance discourses of the letters to shareholders, and 
would seem to represent the management’s deliberate attempts to manage  
Basic performance discourses explain corporate financial performance in a ‘neutral’ and ‘factual’ way 
without implying any causal relations or correlations behind the figures and corporate activities. A 
textbook example can be seen in the excerpt (3) below, in which the CEO presents last year’s sales 
figures as well as gives additional information concerning the breakdown and growth factors of these 
figures.  
(3) The Stockmann Group posted sales of EUR 1 668 million, with sales from continuing op-
erations up 13 per cent on the previous year. Sales in Finland rose by 4 per cent and sales 
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abroad by 40 per cent. Sales by the units abroad rose to 30 per cent of sales from contin-
uing operations. (Stockmann 2007, p. 10). 
Most of the performance discourses seem to follow one basic structure (as can be observed in the 
excerpt above): they highlight parts of the company’s annual accounting information (sales) and then 
give additional cues for interpreting them (breakdown and growth rates). As the accounting infor-
mation is audited, the cues for interpreting this information were, therefore, an easy target for the 
management’s deliberate attempts at impression management through their discursive practices. 
5.3.1 Impression management 
As defined earlier in this thesis, impression management stands for a diverse set of strategic behav-
iors aimed at controlling others’ perception of oneself (Tessarolo et al. 2010). One of the key compo-
nents of impression management behavior observed in the letters to shareholders was selective 
financial representation meaning the presentation of specific financial figures, which help in creating 
a positive image of the company’s performance. The phenomenon of selective financial representa-
tion is difficult to observe on the micro level without analyzing the content of the whole annual re-
port. However, I developed a simple rule for assessing the existence of the phenomenon. In order for 
there to be no or minimal selective representation, content related to declining sales, profits and a 
more negative future outlook as well as a negative overall tone of the letter to shareholders should 
be seen to a larger extent in times of poor or declining performance – which could be expected to be 
during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 for most of the studied companies. As stated earlier in 
this thesis, the tone of the letter was positive every year for all companies and only rare records of 
negative performance were found. Therefore, it can be stated that management does engage in se-
lective financial representation and, thus, impression management practices do take place in the 
letters to shareholders. 
One manifestation of this selective financial representation was the focus on positive content, in 
which certain positive aspects were emphasized in conjunction with presenting negative figures in an 
attempt to direct the reader’s attention to the positive aspect instead of the negative. Excerpts (4), 
(5), (6) and (7) below illustrate this phenomenon. 
(4) The Nordic market slipped slightly, but we gained market share and were the clear mar-
ket leader. (Nokian Tyres 2008, p. 10, emphasis added). 
In this example the CEO of Nokian Tyres clearly states a fact which had a negative effect on perfor-
mance: the Nordic market went down. However, he then adds a positive component to the state-
ment in order to draw the attention away from the negative fact. The end result is a performance 
statement which does not tell the reader what the end result was: did Nokian Tyres make more 
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money in the Nordic market than before by compensating the drop in sales by the gain in market 
share? This example of an emphasis on positive content can also be linked with the selective financial 
representation presented earlier in this chapter, since both imply a similar kind of impression man-
agement practice. 
(5) Hobby Hall, however, suffering from a sharp drop in consumer electronics sales in partic-
ular, saw its earnings fall by more than the other divisions, though it too remained prof-
itable. (Stockmann 2008, p. 10, emphasis added). 
The excerpt from the Stockmann 2008 letter is fairly similar to the one presented before it. A nega-
tive statement is made, after which the attention is turned to a somewhat related positive phenom-
enon: even though the earnings fell quite drastically, the division still managed to make a profit. 
(6) Thanks to the crisis prevention measures, the Group’s earnings as a whole were reasona-
ble given the circumstances, although they were clearly below the previous year’s figure. 
As a result of a decrease in the deferred tax liability, earnings per share actually in-
creased. (Stockmann 2009, p. 10). 
The Stockmann 2009 excerpt differs from the other statements in the sense that it consists of several 
different components, and is perhaps a best example of impression management practices. First, the 
negative component is that the company’s earnings were significantly lower than last year. This 
component is drowned under the positive statement that the company’s earnings were reasonable 
‘given the circumstances’, and thanks to their crisis prevention activities. In the end, the focus is di-
rected towards the ‘positive’ fact that as a result of accounting gimmicks regarding tax liabilities, the 
company’s EPS actually increased. In short, the negative fact that the company’s earnings were clear-
ly lower than in the previous year is put aside by the ‘positive’ statement that their earnings per 
share actually increased due to deferrals. 
(7) The year 2009 was an exceptional one in the history of our Group. Revenue declined and 
operating profit was clearly lower than the year before. However, during the course of 
the year we developed our operations successfully and managed to take advantage of 
opportunities offered by the market conditions. (YIT 2009, p. 6, emphasis added). 
The excerpt from the YIT 2009 annual report is straight-forward: revenues and profits declined, but 
the company developed their operations and acted opportunistically in the financial crisis. The posi-
tive statement placed in order to shift focus from the negative revenue development is, however, 
somewhat vague. Neither the development of operations nor the opportunities of the market condi-
tions are explained further in the letter, so this vagueness can be seen to represent the manage-
ment’s attempt to create a ‘positive reality’ for the company’s previous fiscal year with their discur-
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sive practices. This discursive practice is a different alternative to the selective representation seen 
earlier, in which companies left out any negative information, and is closer to selective financial rep-
resentation with a focus on positive content – except that the positive aspect has been constructed 
by management’s use of language. The ‘successful development of operations’ and ‘taking advantage 
of opportunities offered by market conditions’ are ingeniously vague in the sense that they cannot be 
backed (or disproved) by any empirical evidence, except for the fact that the company’s performance 
did not suggest such developments. Therefore, it can be concluded that, particularly in the case of 
YIT, the management used language blatantly to construct a significantly more positive reality than 
the ‘actual’ world, as Fairclough (2005) put it, would suggest. 
All of the excerpts above illustrate how accompanying negative performance statements with (some-
times rather irrelevant) positive components functions as a part of the impression management rep-
ertoire used in the company’s discourses. These impression management practices seem to be trig-
gered in times of declining or changing performance and, as a result, the tone of the letter to share-
holders becomes more positive than it should be considering the performance of the company. This, 
in turn, portrays the company in a more positive light than would be justified, and may cause the 
readers of the letter to falsely overestimate the current (and future) performance of the company – 
which might potentially lead to bad investment decisions. 
A third part of the impression management repertoire consists of the use of attributions in an im-
pression management mode, i.e. to fill a self-serving role. Even though the use of self-serving attribu-
tions is linked to impression management practices, it was extremely frequent and took so many 
different forms that the phenomenon is best discussed under its own chapter. 
5.3.2 Self-serving attributions 
As stated earlier, self-serving attributions are a particular instance of causal reasoning (Tessarolo et 
al. 2010), in which good news are associated with internal causes and bad news with external causes 
(Aerts 2001). In the studied letters to shareholders, self-serving attributions (along with other im-
pression management practices) were very common, as could be expected based on previous re-
search. In sum, there are two kinds of self-serving attributions: positive internal attributions, where 
positive outcomes are attributed to internal activities; and negative external attributions, where 
negative outcomes are attributed to external conditions. In addition, a few positive external attribu-
tions were identified, in which the company associates positive outcomes to favorable external con-
ditions, but these cannot be considered self-serving. 
Positive internal attributions are a form of self-serving attributions, in which the management takes 
credit for positive outcomes by presenting them as a cause of internal activities, even though that 
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may not be the reality. In the letters to shareholders studied, positive internal attributions were the 
most common type of attributions. The following excerpts all reflect on the company’s performance 
and contain positive internal attributions.  
(8) Fortum’s full-year earnings per share as well as operating profit developed favourably. 
This is partially due to the non-recurring revenue from the divestment of operations out-
side the scope of our strategy. Fortum’s operating profit was also positively affected by 
IFRS accounting treatment of derivates mainly used for hedging Fortum’s power produc-
tion. Our profitability is still at a good level and the structure of our balance sheet and 
our liquidity are strong. Because of these factors, Fortum is well positioned for the future. 
(Fortum 2011, no page number in the online annual report). 
(9) The Kesko Group’s nine per cent sales increase in 2007 and our record profit level show 
that the strategy we have chosen is soundly based and that its implementation is pro-
gressing well. (Kesko 2007, p. 6). 
Excerpts (8) and (9) above represent the basic kind of positive internal attributions, in which the 
management attributes positive development in performance to the management’s strategy and its 
implementation. Fortum does this somewhat implicitly by attributing success to the divestment of 
non-core operations and the management’s hedging activities. Nevertheless, these two are essential-
ly direct operative results of the corporate strategy. Fortum even goes as far as to imply that such 
development may also occur in the future due to a more stringent focus on the company’s strategy. 
Kesko takes a more explicit approach and states that the increase in sales and record level of profits 
achieved is directly attributable to their strategy and its implementation. However, the premises of 
this argument can be challenged by the fact that no such attributions were made in 2008 or 2009, 
when the company’s profitability declined. As could be suspected, the decline in profitability was not 
communicated as the result of a bad strategy or faulty implementation thereof – but instead due to a 
challenging external environment, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. Excerpts (10), (11), 
and (12) below illustrate a second group of positive internal attributions, in which the management 
attributes success to daily operations instead of the top-level corporate strategy. 
(10) In 2007 Nokian Tyres experienced steep growth, especially in Russia and Eastern Europe, 
and expanded its distribution network in strategically important market areas. The big 
investments of recent years began to show as concrete benefits in our business. (Nokian 
Tyres 2007, p. 10). 
(11) The Stockmann Group’s revenue increased during 2011, in particular as a result of signif-
icant capital expenditure projects that were completed at the end of 2010. The opening 
of the Nevsky Centre shopping centre and its Stockmann department store in St Peters-
burg increased revenue in Russia. (Stockmann 2011, p. 6). 
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(12) We succeeded well in infrastructure and in business premises operations in Finland. Un-
derlying the increase in operating profit were our successful measures to improve profit-
ability in Central Europe and favourable residential sales in Russia. (YIT 2011, p. 6). 
On the operative side, the most attributions were towards the company’s investment and sales activ-
ities, as can be seen in the excerpts above. All in all, smaller companies in terms of revenues (Stock-
mann and Nokian Tyres) had more positive internal attributions in their letters to shareholders than 
the larger enterprises (Fortum and Kesko).  
The second kind of self-serving attributions, negative external attributions, were also observed rather 
frequently in the letters to shareholders. In these patterns of causal reasoning, the management tries 
to avoid blame for bad outcomes by associating them to unfavorable external conditions. In the text 
samples studied, negative external attributions were the second-most common type of attributions, 
and the majority of them were directed toward the external business environment. In the compa-
nies’ performance discourses, negative outcomes were communicated to happen as the result of a 
difficult business environment, which was attributed to the financial crisis starting from 2008 – as can 
be seen in excerpts (13), (14), (15) and (16) below. 
(13) In 2008, the growth of the Group's net sales slowed down as a result of the more difficult 
business environment. (Kesko 2008, p. 5). 
(14) The economic crisis had a significant impact on the Group’s earnings trend in the first 
nine months of the year. (Stockmann 2009, p. 10). 
(15) The finance problems facing the tyre business, as well as the increasing uncertainty 
among consumers, contributed to the rapid decline in tyre demand last autumn. (Nokian 
Tyres 2008, p. 10). 
(16) A shift of production towards rental housing production was initiated, but a rapid de-
crease in the demand for owner-occupied housing impaired the profitability of Construc-
tion Services Finland on the whole. Residential sales went well in the Baltic countries, but 
International Construction Services' profitability remained at a modest level due to the 
soft construction market of the area and the rapid slackening of residential sales in Rus-
sia. (YIT 2008, p. 8). 
In summary, the companies attributed their hard times and declining bottom lines to the slowing 
demand and uncertainty caused by the financial crisis. The financial crisis is an easy target in the 
companies’ discourses. In public discourses about the financial crisis, it has been accredited to greedy 
human behavior of people working in financial institutions as well as a failure to audit these actors, 
and the general sentiment among the public towards the claimed activities resulting in the crisis is 
extremely negative. Therefore, the entity of the ‘financial crisis’ is an easy target, since the public 
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feels strongly against the crisis and, at the same time, acknowledges that the crisis did in fact cause a 
more difficult and uncertain external environment. 
Considering this, it is no surprise that most of the negative external attributions were observed in the 
2008 and 2009 letters to shareholders. There is no point in denying that the financial crisis had its 
impact on the performance and future outlook for companies all around the world, which is why 
these attributions can, with a  quick glance, be considered credible and somewhat unbiased from the 
external audience’s point of view. However, the fact remains that not all companies had negative 
external attributions in their 2008 and 2009 letters – even in the five companies studied in this the-
sis. As the excerpt (17) below shows, some companies survived the crisis without blaming the exter-
nal environment: 
(17) Our overall results were good and, operationally, it was the best year ever, even though 
the operating environment was very challenging. (Fortum 2008, p. 16). 
In addition to self-serving attributional content, two cases for non-self-serving attributions could be 
identified: positive external attributions and negative internal attributions. Positive external attribu-
tions were a very rare kind of attribution, in which the management attributes positive outcomes to 
favorable external factors instead of internal activities. Only a handful of these were observed in the 
letters to shareholders. As could be predicted, negative internal attributions, in which the manage-
ment would take blame for negative outcomes, were not seen at all. An example of positive external 
attributions can be found in excerpt (18) below. 
(18) The sharp decline of the Swedish krona caused by the financial crisis has also decreased 
the amount of krona-denominated debt taken to finance the acquisition, which in turn 
has had a positive impact on the balance sheet. (Stockmann 2008, p. 10). 
It is worth mentioning that positive internal attributions were the most common kind of attributions 
in general, but especially in times of good performance. On the other hand, in times of poor or de-
clining performance, negative external attributions were the most common – and overall they were 
the second-most common kind of attributions. Most interesting is that the majority of attributions 
and impression management related statements were found in the communication of performance, 
with only a few related to the discourses of growth, Russia and products and services. This could be 
due to the fact that performance is a result of hundreds of large and small factors – both internal and 
external –, which makes it nearly impossible to attribute it to specific internal or external causes. 
Therefore, in evaluating these performance discourses, it is difficult for the external audience to 
prove or disprove the causal relations presented by management – except by using the methodology 
of critical discourse analysis and examining the underlying motives that managers have for a specific 
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use of language. For a visual illustration of the attributions described in this chapter, see the out-
come-cause matrix below. 
 
Figure 5: Outcome-cause matrix of attributions 
Essentially, the finding that both kinds of self-serving attributions were the most common, was strik-
ing but unsurprising. On the other hand, surprising was the fact that self-serving attributional behav-
ior was as common as it was: records of self-serving attributions, both internal and external, were 
found in each letter to shareholders of each company. As a result, it would therefore seem that man-
agement does indeed engage in various self-serving discursive practices which aim at creating a more 
generous social reality – a more positive view of the company. In essence, fulfilling this self-serving 
agenda results in not only an overly positive letter to shareholders, but also ‘wrong’ causal reasoning 
patterns in explaining how the company ended up with their results – which in the end will amount 
to the company communicating something else than a ‘true and fair view’ of their company. Then 
again, this is essentially the power as well as the curse of the constitutive nature of discourse (Fair-
clough 2005), in the sense that discourses – as a power capable of (re-)creating social reality – can be 
used in this kind of behavior. And indeed, the management would seem to have incentives to do so. 
To protect investors from these deliberate discursive practices of the company’s top management, a 
more formal code of conduct or even an audit process should be set up for the accounting discourses 
in annual reports. 
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In addition to the company’s previous year’s financial performance, which is the result of previous 
growth investments, the main audience of the letter to shareholders is interested in the company’s 
capability to generate increasing profits also in the future. For this purpose, the growth discourse has 
a key role in the letters to shareholders. 
5.4 Growth 
After the company’s financial performance, growth sources and prospects were the second-most 
frequent discourse in the letter to shareholders. Growth is extremely important for the external au-
dience, since they generally have a financial interest towards the company – usually from owning 
shares or thinking about purchasing them. To businesses (or at least their shareholders), growth has 
for long had an intrinsic value, and over-the-market growth means over-the-market intrinsic value. In 
order to meet or even exceed shareholders’ expectations and seem like an attractive target for in-
vestments, companies need to be able to present firm plans, targets and achievements for growth. 
Therefore, the external audience wants to understand how much the company has grown from the 
previous year, how this growth has been achieved and how much the company expects to grow in 
the future.  
In the letters to shareholders, two specific growth-related discourses were dominant: the question of 
how the growth has been or will be achieved, and the question of where to pursue further growth 
opportunities. Of these two key discourses, the latter was the most dominant, and the most common 
answer to that question was unsurprisingly Russia. Indeed, the growth discourse was very rarely (if at 
all) seen without a mention of Russia. The growth discourses, in which Russia was not mentioned, 
revolved around growth methods, as can be seen in the following excerpts (19) and (20). 
(19) Over the past twenty years or so, Stockmann’s expansion has been driven by organic 
growth. Last year, the company added significantly to this underlying growth by acquir-
ing, through a public tender offer, the Lindex fashion chain of Sweden, which became a 
new Stockmann division. - - As a consequence of the deal, the Group’s sales will increase 
by about a third. (Stockmann 2007, p. 10). 
(20) We are seeking growth through organic business expansion and through acquisitions. 
We acquire companies that strengthen and complement our services and our geographic 
network of local offices.  (YIT 2009, p. 7). 
In excerpt (19) Stockmann discusses the ‘how’ of their growth strategy, and the recent change there-
in. In essence, they have shifted from an organic-driven growth strategy to one consisting of acquisi-
tions with the recent purchase of the Lindex fashion chain, which in the financial crisis came to form 
the majority of the group’s operating profits. In excerpt (20) YIT gives a brief overview on their 
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growth strategy. All in all this growth method discourse (organic growth versus acquisitions) was the 
only growth-related discourse, in which Russia was not extensively referred to. The ‘common’ way 
for the five studied companies to discuss growth in conjunction with Russia in their letter to share-
holders can be seen in excerpts (20), (21) and (22) below: 
(21) Growth will remain our key target, with European and Russian market development as 
the main drivers. - - We will continue to seek new opportunities in our current market ar-
eas, and beyond, to ensure future growth. (Fortum 2007, p. 8). 
(22) We advanced in Russia according to our target level of 50 per cent annual growth and 
expanded our residential production to yet another metropolis. (YIT 2007, p. 8). 
(23) With regard to residential construction, the focus of our growth is on Russia. (YIT 2011, p. 
7). 
In summary, all companies discussed growth in all of their letters to shareholders, the only excep-
tions being Fortum in 2008 and 2009, and Kesko in 2008. The high frequency of growth discourses 
seems intuitive, since growth is one of the key goals of any company. The term ‘profitable growth’ 
seemed to appear in the majority of growth discourses as the company’s main growth strategy. It is 
worth noting, that companies tend to fall short of this ideal: top-level revenue growth can in most 
cases be achieved but, surprisingly, bottom-line profits do not grow in the same proportions – or at 
all. A five-year period should be long enough for showing some results with a ‘profitable growth’ 
strategy even in Russia, but none of the companies have seemed to achieve this goal – and have re-
sorted to impression management behaviors to cover up for it. This is a finding, which is aligned with 
the research by among others Staw et al. (1983) and Clatworthy & Jones (2003). It would seem that 
the combination of strict shareholder expectations of growing profits and falling short of these tar-
gets puts pressure on top management to use growth discourses in constructing a ‘reality’, in which 
the company is portrayed as an actor pursuing significant growth, and in that light several investment 
programs are presented. However, the fact remains that these investment programs have lately not 
been able to produce anything else except top-line growth, with profits declining with each invest-
ment. Therefore, the concept of ‘profitable growth’, and not least in the context of Russia, can and 
should be challenged. It would seem that, in the context of the companies studied, the term is an 
oxymoron with the appearance of one of the terms (either profitability or growth) overriding the 
possibility for the other to exist. Therefore, whenever the discourse of ‘profitable growth’ appears in 
a company’s external communications, readers should exercise caution in reading the textual pas-
sages surrounding it.  
Unsurprisingly, most space was dedicated to growth discourses in times of economic stability, years 
2007, 2010 and 2011. The three most discussed areas regarding growth were growth methods, geo-
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graphic growth areas and the future outlook of growth, which will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5.6. Of these three areas, geographic growth areas were emphasized the most, and of all the 
possible locations, Russia was mentioned most often in conjunction with growth discourses. From 
the point-of-view of the growth discourses of Finnish companies, Russia and growth seem to be in-
separable. This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
5.5 Russia 
Since growth was one of the key discourses present in all the letters to shareholders, it comes as no 
surprise that Russia was the most referenced foreign market across all years and companies studied. 
As explained in the previous chapter, Russia was mostly discussed in conjunction with the growth 
discourse, and as a result, the tone in which Russia was mentioned, was mostly positive. Similarly, 
since Russia was mostly present next to growth discourses; the frequency of Russia discourses was 
highest during times of economic stability and growth: years 2007, 2010 and 2011 in the scope of this 
study. 
The country was mentioned in almost all of the letters to shareholders, and a trend could be per-
ceived in which companies that gained a larger share of their revenues from Russian operations 
(Nokian Tyres and Stockmann) also correspondingly devoted more space to Russia-related discourses 
and communicated specifics of the target market more thoroughly in their letters to shareholders. 
However, the differences in the amount of Russia-related discourses were rather small across the 
five companies studied – more striking was the comparison between Russia and other foreign coun-
tries: Russia was the only foreign country, which was referenced to by all of the companies in almost 
all of the letters to shareholders. The excerpts below illustrate the rationale that companies gave for 
their expansion activities to Russia. 
(24) Russia is a very interesting market area for us and one in which we have also decades of 
experience. The Russian electricity market is in the midst of sweeping reforms that will 
unlock the world’s fourth-largest electricity market to new players. We felt that there are 
good growth opportunities and demand for Fortum’s expertise and know-how in Russia. 
(Fortum 2008, p. 16, emphasis added). 
(25) Russia’s heat markets are of interest to Fortum because of the huge potential for ener-
gy-efficiency improvements in the country’s heat sector. (Fortum 2011, no page number-
ing in online report, emphasis added). 
(26) The direction for growth is, above all, the large and fast growing market in Russia, 
where Kesko is continuing to further strengthen the network of building and home im-
provement stores. We are also investigating opportunities for expanding the food trade, 
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the car and machinery trade, and the sports trade into Russia. (Kesko 2010, p. 6, empha-
sis added). 
(27) The cost and tax advantages of manufacture in Russia boosted significantly the profita-
bility of our business. (Nokian Tyres 2007, p. 10, emphasis added). 
(28) We have operated in Russia continuously since 1961 in various economic conditions and 
we know the market and the customer base. (YIT 2008, p. 8, emphasis added). 
As can be seen in the excerpts above, various reasons for investing in Russia were given, and all of 
them related to the attractiveness of the target market. Besides the obvious market size, fast growth 
potential and emerging nature of the market seen in excerpts (26) and (24), companies also listed 
reasons related to their core competences (excerpt (25)). In addition, a more opportunistic approach 
was presented by Nokian Tyres in the 2007 letter to shareholders, excerpt (27), in which the cost and 
tax advantages for manufacturing operations in Russia were mentioned. And, finally, in conjunction 
with Johanson and Vahlne (1977), market knowledge was presented by YIT in their 2008 letter, as 
can be seen in excerpt (28). All in all, discourses revolving around the justification for the expansion 
activities to Russia were rare, and very generic in nature. The potential growth opportunities were 
not quantified or backed up by numerical data. Nevertheless, Russia was presented as a lucrative 
target market and discussed mainly in a positive light. 
However, as illustrated in chapter 2, operating in Russia also creates various challenges due to cul-
tural, environmental and political differences. Keeping that in mind, it was surprising to find that only 
a handful of the many problems commonly associated with the Russian business environment were 
discussed in the letters to shareholders – or, rather, companies’ Russia-discourses mentioned a few 
challenges and even fewer direct problems in their Russian operations. In discourse, challenges can 
be considered a lighter pre-stage to a problem – i.e. when a challenge gets worse, it becomes a prob-
lem. In the letters to shareholders, only two kinds of challenges were mentioned. They can be rough-
ly categorized to external market challenges and internal strategy challenges. The main market chal-
lenge was the dependency of the Russian economy on the price of oil, which is illustrated in excerpts 
(29) and (30). 
(29) In Russia, the trend in the economy is to a great extent dependent on the price of energy. 
(Stockmann 2008, p. 11). 
(30) In Russia, the oil price has an effect on consumer behaviour; the current level of USD 100 
per barrel supports favourable development in residential sales. (YIT 2010, p. 7). 
In short, the excerpts above relate to the point that more than any of the neighboring economies, 
the Russian economy is heavily dependent on the price of oil. According to the letters to sharehold-
ers, low oil price correlates with poor GDP development and leads to decreased purchasing power 
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and changed consumer behavior. The main internal challenge was the relatively low level of sustain-
ability in Russia illustrated in excerpt (31) below. 
(31) Operating in Russia creates a new challenge to [Fortum’s strategy of sustainable energy 
production], because fossil fuels are an integral part of Russia’s energy system. However, 
Fortum has only one operating model under which it operates everywhere, including in 
Russia. We are going to be a forerunner in sustainability also there. (Fortum 2008, p. 18). 
Literature on foreign operations suggests that the best results in foreign markets are achieved when 
adapting the operating model to match local conditions (Larimo & Huuhka 2007). However, Fortum 
has decided to stick to their strategy and keep the same operating model of sustainable energy pro-
duction also in Russia. Even though this is discussed as a challenge in the letter to shareholders, just 
two pages earlier Fortum has mentioned the demand for Fortum’s expertise and the emerging ener-
gy market of Russia as a possibility for utilizing their competences. Therefore, the ‘challenge’ men-
tioned by Fortum is, in fact, an attempt to disguise one of their opportunities and key strengths as a 
disguise and mask the fact that the discourse is not about challenges, but rather a marketing-
oriented statement about the company’s internal capabilities. 
As can be seen from the excerpts above, Russia-related discourses had a mostly positive sentiment to 
them, and were presented in conjunction with possibilities for growth and profitability improve-
ments. Challenges in pursuing the foreign market were also identified, but left to a very small role in 
the letters to shareholders. When a challenge escalates to a situation, where damage control is the 
only viable option, companies may start talking about a problem. However, the management’s self-
serving interests contradict the discourse of actual problems, which is why such discourses are hardly 
ever published outside the company – or even internally. The only exception to this rule was Stock-
mann with their open discussion of acute problems in the Russian business environment in three of 
their letters to shareholders: 2007, 2008 and 2009. These problems, as illustrated in excerpts (32), 
(33) and (34) below, relate to the unreliability of formal institutions in the Russian business environ-
ment.  
(32) Stockmann Nevsky Centre shopping centre project that is under construction in the cen-
tre of St Petersburg will reach completion more slowly than expected due to the red tape 
connected with obtaining permits. (Stockmann 2007, p. 11, emphasis added). 
(33) The largest non-recurring item was a considerable loss as a result of the closure of the 
Smolenskaya department store in Moscow. The department store had to be closed be-
cause of the unlawful activities of the lessors, which were in breach of the lease agree-
ment. The legal proceedings, through which Stockmann is claiming damages from the 
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lessors, are still pending in the International Commercial Arbitration Court (ICAC) in Mos-
cow. (Stockmann 2008, p. 10, emphasis added). 
(34) Stockmann was forced to close its department store in the Smolensky Passage shopping 
centre in Moscow in 2008 because its lessor acted illegally and in breach of contract. The 
International Commercial Arbitration Court of Moscow (ICAC) ruled in favour of Stock-
mann in the dispute and ordered the lessor to pay the company significant damages. In 
Russia, however, rulings by the International Commercial Arbitration Court have to be af-
firmed by a court belonging to the Russian judicial system. Contrary to earlier practice, 
the Russian courts, including the Highest Arbitration Court, have overturned rulings of 
the International Commercial Arbitration Court. The proceedings to affirm the damages 
awarded are still pending at the Highest Arbitration Court. From the perspective of the 
rule of law and international investment in Russia, I consider it very unfortunate that 
Russia’s judicial system, against international conventions, refuses to ratify the rulings 
of the international arbitration court that has legal jurisdiction. (Stockmann 2009, p. 
10-11, emphasis added). 
The problematic stories of Stockmann highlight the issues identified in existing literature, which were 
presented in Chapter 2.2.3. Essentially, Stockmann’s operations in Russia were severely harmed by 
the weakness of the formal institutions. In the first case, excerpt (31), bureaucracy hindered Stock-
mann from completing their shopping center project in St Petersburg on time causing increased costs 
and lost revenues. As the previous literature in Chapter 2.2.3 explained, bureaucrats in Russia may 
arbitrarily decide to either help or sabotage the entry of a foreign company. The following two ex-
cerpts relate to the same case, but illustrate two different viewpoints to the weak legitimacy of for-
mal institutions in Russia. Excerpt (32) describes the issue: Stockmann posted a considerable non-
recurring loss from having to close one of their department stores due unlawful activities of the les-
sors. What was not explained in the letter to shareholders, however, was that these unlawful activi-
ties essentially meant arbitrarily cutting the power from the whole department store. Following this 
description, excerpt (33), from the following year continues illustrating the case by explaining that 
the ICAC agreed in favor of Stockmann in the case, but the Russian courts have not affirmed the case. 
From the point of view of a company doing business in Russia, not being able to count on the local 
authorities to enforce the law is a rather large show-stopper.  
However, since no other company mentioned problems with the Russian business environment in 
their letters to shareholders, and since mentioning problems explicitly in otherwise positive dis-
courses is not self-serving but self-defeating, one has to wonder the motives that Stockmann had for 
communicating these issues. It could be that their aim was to ignite the flame of change in the Rus-
sian business environment; to sway the local court to ratify the verdict given by ICAC, or just to warn 
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other companies of the unpredictable circumstances in which business takes place in Russia. In any 
case, I find it hard to believe that Stockmann would have communicated these problems in a self-
defeating way just to engage in more transparent discourses towards external stakeholders. Howev-
er, if that was the case, I welcome the initiative and hope that the phenomenon of open discourse 
becomes more common. 
Since the Russia-discourses seem to coexist with growth discourses, and are mostly positive, one has 
to wonder whether there is more than meets the eye behind them. Indeed, when looking at the 
studied companies’ financial performance in Russia, operations there have revolved below the break-
even point, and sometimes even significantly lower (Stockmann had yet to make a profit in Russia 
before 2011). Only few companies (YIT and Nokian Tyres) were able to make a constant profit in their 
neighboring market. The following excerpt (35) from Fortum illustrates this in more detail. 
(35) This creates the confidence that our Russia Division’s results will be at a clearly positive 
level in 2010, as we have stated earlier. (Fortum 2009, p. 17). 
When looking at actual results of the studied companies in Russia, it is shocking to find that the ma-
jority of companies consistently showing a loss in their Russian operations. Therefore, there seems to 
be a contradiction between the ‘growth in Russia’ discourses of companies and their rationale for 
expanding to Russia. Indeed, when looking at the ‘growth in Russia’ discourse in the light of actual 
performance in the market, there is a rather large gap to be explained between the reality construct-
ed by discourse and the reality experienced by companies in the market. The explanation to this may 
be the one I touched upon in the previous chapter’s growth discourses. Since companies are pressur-
ized by shareholder expectations to show constantly growing profits, and actually falling short of 
these expectations in their operations, managers feel the need to compensate for this shortcoming 
by using language in constructing a ‘reality’, in which the management is actively seeking growth by 
expanding to Russia, which is essentially aligned with the results of Staw et al. (1983). This overcom-
pensation can be seen in two ways in the Russia-related discourses: first, in the discursive practice of 
undermining or not discussing obvious problems in the Russian market and, second, in the practice of 
discussing Russia only in conjunction with growth discourses. Essentially, what results is the man-
agement’s attempt to legitimize their expansion to the foreign market – especially when the 
achieved results are not promising. In fact, expansion to Russia may not be driven by a genuine pur-
suit of ‘profitable growth’ in the target market, but rather manifest itself as a response to sharehold-
ers’ expectations. 
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Since growth is one of the shareholders’ main expectations, and the management has been seen to 
react to this expectation by using a variety of self-serving discursive practices, another interesting 
discourse to look at is the future outlook given by these companies. Keeping in mind the contradic-
tion between actual and communicated performance and growth (especially in Russia), the state-
ments companies issue about their potential future profits should be interesting to read. 
5.6 Future outlook 
Indeed, the external target audience for the letter to shareholders is extremely interested in how the 
company communicates their future outlook, i.e. how they see the growth potential and the future 
development of their company’s performance. After all, it is the future capability of the company to 
generate constantly growing profits that provides shareholders and potential investors a sufficient 
yield for their investment. Since future outlook discourses are one of the key expectations for the 
target audience, it was striking to find that in some cases, companies did not give any explicit outlook 
for their future performance. This trend was mostly observed during times of uncertainty – in 2008 
and 2009 (see Figure 7 below), and is consistent with the management’s discursive practice of selec-
tive representation seen in other key discourses. 
The ways future outlooks are discussed in the letter to shareholders vary significantly across compa-
nies. Of the five studied companies, Stockmann and Nokian Tyres were the leaders in future outlook 
discourses in both the quality and quantity of the information. Stockmann and Nokian Tyres had a 
whole chapter dedicated to the future outlook with rich and detailed descriptions of the manage-
ment’s future forecasts and expectations, whereas other companies tended to sprinkle future-
related information all over the letter to shareholders – or hardly discuss it at all. Fortum, Kesko and 
YIT mainly concentrated on presenting ‘facts’ related to their current and potential performance, and 
left out any management views or forecasts. A more detailed table of the future outlooks for each 
company in each of the letters to shareholders can be seen in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 6: Annual future outlook for studied companies 
As Figure 7 above shows, the future outlook sentiments tended to correlate across the companies for 
each year, with some individual fluctuation. In general, all companies gave a positive outlook for the 
following year except for 2009 (in the 2008 letter to shareholders), for which the majority of outlooks 
were negative. Exceptions were provided by Fortum, whose defensive business enabled picturing a 
positive future, and Stockmann, which due to declining demand issued the only negative future out-
look during the five-year research period. Nokian Tyres also sticks out with its trend of issuing a very 
positive outlook whenever the general economic conditions were improving and/or stabilizing. In 
addition to Stockmann’s negative future outlook, other striking observations were marked in red in 
Figure 7 above. 
The trend perceived earlier in this study, in which the discourses of Russia and growth seemed to 
coexist, also persisted in regards to the companies’ future outlook for business in Russia: Russia was 
mainly noted as a source for growth, and especially higher growth than in the domestic European 
market. The trend was disrupted by two single exceptions (marked in red in the figure above): the 
Kesko 2008 letter, in which Russia was not mentioned at all, and the YIT 2008 letter, in which the 
company states to have a ‘long-term approach’ in Russia, which makes the apparent ‘temporary 
slow-down’ of sales in Russia ‘more acceptable’. Admitting to a decline in sales one year in advance 
can be seen as a bold move from YIT, but using a ‘long-term approach’ in Russia as a method for jus-
tifying the decline sends an alarming message to the careful reader: in all other letters to sharehold-
Fortum Positive Growing importance Similar to 2007 or better Sustainability, energy asset privatization in Russia
Kesko Positive Growth Improving Social reponsibility, investments, opening hundreds of new stores
Nokian Tyres Very positive Growth Better than in 2007 Growth, internal capability and process development
Stockmann Positive Growth Improved operating profit Favorable trend in operating environment, slower growth than before
YIT Positive Growth Revenue & pre-tax profit increase Strong order backlog, balanced business structure
Fortum Positive Profitability Fortum will weather the downturn No new projects except Russia and possible 3rd nuclear plant in Loviisa
Kesko Neutral Not discussed Strong position, no outlook given Work productivity, cost effectiveness, maintaining financial position
Nokian Tyres Neutral Market share growth Strong position, no outlook given Downsizing activities, market share growth, preparing for low growth
Stockmann Negative Economic trends Focus on maintaining a good level Measures for adapting to lower demand, forecasting is difficult
YIT Neutral Temporary slow-down No outlook given Long-term approach in Russia, rental housing and infra in Finland stronger
Fortum Neutral Positive results No outlook given Focus on strategic issues with the new organization
Kesko Neutral Growth & expansion Strong position, no outlook given Profitable growth, investments, sustainability, employees
Nokian Tyres Positive Positive expectations Strong potential for growth Positive development in Russia, market and price leadership
Stockmann Positive Growth Growth, better operating profit Two large investment projects completing in 2010
YIT Positive Growth Revenue & pre-tax profit increase Profitable growth, growth through acquisitions
Fortum Positive Growth No explicit outlook given Earnings growth in Russia, attracting investors, integrating energy market
Kesko Positive Growth & expansion Competitiveness will be enhanced Profitable growth in Finland and nearby areas, sustainability
Nokian Tyres Very positive Growth & investments Better than in 2010 Product success in car magazine tests, Russia investments, high order intake
Stockmann Positive Growth Growth, better operating profit GDP growth in key markets, growth from finished investment projects
YIT Very positive Growth Growth of over 10 % annually Growth targets raised, residential sales outlook promising
Fortum Positive Growth Improving, strong position Integrating European energy markets, growth in Russia and Asia
Kesko Positive Growth, new stores Improving, strong position Profitable growth, capital expenditure, sustainability, politics
Nokian Tyres Very positive Growth, investments Good prospects for growth New plant in Russia, investments in process and IT development
Stockmann Positive Growth, performance Growth, good earnings performance Gaining benefits from completed capex projects, cost structure checks
YIT Positive Growth Revenues at par, profits increased Investing in sustainability, residential sales outlook good
Future outlook for the next year(s)
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Key points for the future
Annual 
report Company
Overall 
sentiment for 
the future
Russia discussed in 
the context of
Performance
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ers, YIT tracks yearly growth in Russia and posts ambitious goals for it without mentioning any long-
term approach. 
The performance outlooks for the companies were rather similar across all companies on a yearly 
basis. During stable economic conditions, companies anticipated to show growth for the next year, 
with the operative profit being similar or better than in the previous year. On the other hand, in a 
more challenging external environment, companies opted not to give any performance outlook at all 
(60 % of studied companies in 2008), and those which gave a performance outlook, kept it at a very 
vague level such as ‘Fortum will weather the downturn’ (Fortum 2008). Moreover, in difficult times, 
companies tended to emphasize their current ‘strong financial position’ instead of stating anything 
explicit about their future financial position. This would seem to confirm the self-serving behavior 
observed earlier in this thesis, in which companies tend to avoid blame for negative outcomes by 
focusing on the positive and leaving anything negative unsaid – selective (financial) representation.  
The key points for the future showed several similarities between the five companies studied. ‘Prof-
itable growth’ was the standard term for performance outlooks in a favorable operating environ-
ment. Besides profitable growth, other standard terms such as ‘sustainability’, ‘capital expenditure’ 
and ‘investment programs’ were observed frequently in the future outlooks. This could be due to the 
fact that the external audience is expecting to see evidence of the management’s activities for secur-
ing future growth, and the management wants to keep up an image of a competent, active manage-
ment, in which the shareholders can trust. All of these activities were, in fact, ongoing in the compa-
nies, but explicitly mentioning even the smallest investments could be seen as an impression man-
agement behavior pattern. 
In order to see the high-level trend in the future outlooks shaped by the external environment, in 
which the companies operate, it is essential to take a look at the key excerpts from each company’s 
future outlook for each year. With a quick glance it is easy to see, how abruptly the external condi-
tions changed, and how the companies’ future outlooks changed from overly positive statements for 
the future to neutral statements defending the current strong financial position of the companies – 
or focusing on other positive aspects of their business. Thus, the actual ‘future’ part of the outlook 
was almost completely left out in 2008 and 2009, as can be seen in the excerpts below. 
(36) In 2007, Fortum achieved its all-time best result. - - I believe we are well positioned to re-
peat this success in 2008. (Fortum 2007, p. 8). 
(37) The growth prospects in and after 2008 are good. We are operating in a tyre market that 
is characterised by continued strong growth, and our position as market leader is strong-
er than ever. - - We have met our challenges boldly and start the new year full of confi-
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dence. Our future prospects are positive, and we have every reason to believe that we 
will remain on a strong growth track in line with our strategy. (Nokian Tyres 2007, p. 10). 
(38) The outlook for 2008 is also positive. Our order backlog at the beginning of the year was 
at an all-time high, corresponding to the workload of 11 months. We estimate that the 
Group’s revenue and profit before taxes for 2008 will increase compared to the previous 
year. (YIT 2007, p. 8). 
The year 2007 was characterized by an almost overheated economic cycle, in which companies post-
ed record profits and were doing well in every aspect of their business. As can be seen in excerpts 
(36) to (38) above, the future outlooks given by each company were extremely positive. Fortum was 
expecting to meet their all-time high result of 2007 in the following year, Nokian Tyres anticipated 
continued strong growth and strong market leadership and YIT had an all-time high order backlog at 
the beginning of the year. When forecasting without any visibility to the future, the best estimate is 
always your current performance. Clearly, companies were expecting to repeat their current success, 
and even exceed it (in the case of YIT). However, as the following excerpts (39) to (43) will show, the 
abrupt change in economic conditions following the fall of Lehman Brothers and start of the financial 
crisis changed the way companies viewed their future. 
(39) Fortum has a good organisation and, consequently, we are in a good position to weather 
also the downturn in the economy. (Fortum 2008, p. 18). 
(40) The cost-effectiveness of investments is assessed more carefully and they are postponed, 
if necessary. Our aim is to maintain the good financial position and benefit from lower 
construction costs when building new store sites. (Kesko 2008, p. 4). 
(41) I believe the global recession will be deep and relatively long. Growth is likely to remain 
weak for at least the next two years. Nokian Tyres heads into the years of low growth 
from a good position. We have a strong balance sheet and good profitability. Our financ-
es can endure the forecasted temporary drop in profitability. (Nokian Tyres 2008, p. 10). 
(42) In the current environment, making forecasts for 2009 is extremely difficult. It is likely 
that all of Stockmann’s market areas will experience an economic slowdown and nega-
tive growth. (Stockmann 2008, p. 11) 
(43) It is still too early to predict the duration of the recession, but the operating environment 
will be more challenging this year than the last one. We will intensify our sales efforts, 
decrease working capital, ensure our competitiveness with an extensive development 
programme and leverage the opportunities offered by the change in the market condi-
tions. History has shown that companies with a solid corporate culture and sustainable 
demand based on real needs remain as the top companies in their fields both during and 
after economic downturns. We intend to continue being one of those companies. (YIT 
2008, p. 8). 
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The change from overly positive statements to the fairly neutral descriptions of the company’s cur-
rent financial position (40, 41) or even negative views for the future (42) is dramatic and illustrates 
that all the companies were taken by surprise by the events of 2008. Even though the economic situ-
ation started to improve gradually in the latter part of 2009, the effects of the downturn can still be 
seen in the future outlooks given for 2010. Most of the companies still emphasized their current 
strong financial position or other aspects of their business, such as Fortum’s ‘focus on strategic is-
sues’ (44). 
(44) We have initiated goal-oriented development work in conjunction with the new organi-
sation, and we will focus on strategic issues at great length during the year. (Fortum 
2009, p. 18). 
(45) Kesko’s solvency, cash flow and liquidity are at an excellent level. A strong balance sheet 
and good financial standing provide Kesko with opportunities for making investments 
during recession, too. - - We will continue to investigate opportunities for expanding the 
food trade into international markets, particularly in Russia. (Kesko 2009, p. 4). 
(46) We anticipate a gradual recovery of demand in 2010. The number of tyres in the distribu-
tion channel is now clearly lower than a year earlier, which means there is potential for 
sales growth. Our new and improved product range is in top form, and we have the in-
dustry’s most effective distribution channel in our core markets. We expect our market 
and price leadership in our core markets together with our new industrial structure to 
support our cash flow and profitability this year. We are in a good position and ready to 
expand operations as soon as the market growth accelerates. (Nokian Tyres 2009, p. 3). 
(47) Trends in the world economy indicate that slight growth can be expected in 2010. There 
are many uncertainties at play, however, and equity markets, in particular, are reacting 
nervously to even the slightest piece of bad news. It seems that, even in the best case, we 
have to prepare ourselves for a long period of slow economic growth. - - [T]he company 
is aiming for a moderate growth in sales in 2010. Our objective is to also achieve a better 
operating profit than last year, despite the high investments. (Stockmann 2009, p. 11). 
(48) Our starting position for 2010 is a strong one. We estimate that the Group’s revenue will 
increase and profit before taxes will increase significantly in 2010 compared to 2009. (YIT 
2009, p. 7). 
As can be seen from the future outlooks given in 2009, some companies weathered the downturn 
better than others, and showed that in their outlooks for the following year. For example, Nokian 
Tyres based the positive future outlook on the empty inventories of their customers and their good 
product range (46). However, others were still uncertain about their future, and opted not to give 
any performance outlook at all, and instead discuss only their current financial standing (45). But as 
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the year went by and the economic situation clearly improved, companies started once again includ-
ing growth and emerging markets into their future outlooks. 
(49) In line with our strategy, our goal is to develop three key areas in our business: leverage 
our strong Nordic core, create solid earnings growth in Russia, and build a platform for 
future growth. We are researching opportunities in the integrating European power 
market and also in Asia’s growth markets, particularly in terms of CHP. (Fortum 2010, p. 
15). 
(50) In addition to the Finnish market, Kesko aims at profitable growth in nearby areas. - - 
Competitiveness will be improved by continuing the strong development of the store 
network. (Kesko 2010, p. 6). 
(51) One of the main achievements, in terms of our future, was yet again the excellent suc-
cess of our products in car magazine tests. Independent reviews testifying to the superi-
ority of our tyres in northern conditions put us in a good position to continue as a market 
and price leader in the future. (Nokian Tyres 2010, p. 5). 
(52) The global economy will continue to grow in 2011, driven by the world’s emerging econ-
omies. The economic situation in Europe and the euro zone will depend to a significant 
extent on whether confidence in the functioning of the financial markets can be pre-
served. Growth in Europe will in any event be slower than in the emerging economies. 
(Stockmann 2010, p. 11). 
(53) Our view is that residential sales will continue at a favourable level both in Finland and in 
Russia. We actively started new residential projects in 2010, which will offer us a solid 
starting point for 2011. - -   Our aim is to grow our business at a faster rate in the next 
few years - by more than 10% per year on average. Our growth is spearheaded by service 
and maintenance operations, residential construction and energy solutions. Focusing on 
these will allow us to lead the way. (YIT 2010, p. 7). 
Clearly the financial crisis and harder years of 2008 and 2009 had taken companies by surprise, and 
even though their financial performance as well as the visibility to the external environment im-
proved every year, the future outlooks given in 2010 for the following year were still careful. Howev-
er, most notable is that companies were now anticipating growth in their key markets, and some, 
such as YIT, even raised their annual growth target significantly (53). Even though some companies 
were posting almost record-level profits, the impact of the financial crisis on their future outlooks is 
fairly visible. If companies would communicate their future outlooks based on previous performance 
in a similar manner than in 2007, the future outlooks for 2011 should be significantly more positive 
than they actually were. Therefore, in terms of future outlook discourses, companies currently seem 
to choose their words more carefully and avoid giving overly optimistic estimations. This carefulness 
can also be observed in the most recent future outlooks highlighted in excerpts (54) to (58) below. 
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(54) Fortum’s strong balance sheet and productive capital structure enable us to be well pre-
pared also for a more uncertain outlook. In the future, the relative share of electricity in 
total energy consumption will grow, offering Fortum more business opportunities. I be-
lieve that we have good potential to grow in line with our mission and strategy. (Fortum 
2011, no page numbering in online annual report). 
(55) This year, development in the trading sector will also depend on the trends in employ-
ment and consumers' disposable income. The sector's ability to employ and produce ser-
vices directly or indirectly is significant for the Finnish national economy and the welfare 
society. If implemented, equal taxes and a rise in the tax rate will cut households' con-
sumption, resulting in a decline in sales in the trading sector, and lowering employment 
in Finland. An increase in the number of regulations that erode the competitive basis of 
the trading sector in Finland and the European Union also limits the opportunities to 
serve customers and operate efficiently. (Kesko 2011, p. 7). 
(56) As we move into 2012, our prospects for growth are good despite various uncertainty 
factors. Our finances are strong and the company is debt-free, which makes it possible to 
invest in growth. Our position is strong in our key markets and will strengthen further. 
Our product range is competitive, our productivity one of the best in the business, and 
our distribution network is expanding fast. (Nokian Tyres 2011, p. 3). 
(57) The unstable state of the world economy creates a challenging basis for assessing the fu-
ture performance of the Stockmann Group. Visibility in the market conditions, especially 
in the Nordic countries, has never been this weak during my term as Chief Executive Of-
ficer. If a solution to restore market confidence can be found for the European sovereign 
debt crisis, recovery could even start during the current year. Continuing uncertainty 
means that we must all prepare for harder times and through this an automatic down-
ward slide in the economy. (Stockmann 2011, p. 6). 
(58) The high degree of uncertainty about the general macroeconomic development may 
have a negative effect also on decision-making by our customers and thereby the devel-
opment and performance of YIT’s business operations. Nevertheless, we believe that we 
can make our operations more efficient and improve the profitability of our business. We 
estimate that in 2012, the combined revenue of the business segments will remain at the 
level of 2011 and that operating profit will increase compared to 2011. (YIT 2011, p. 7). 
While it is true that the economic cycles have shortened and times turned more turbulent, the effect 
of the surprisingly strong downturn in 2008 can still be seen in the future outlooks of companies. In 
2011, all companies included an element of uncertainty in their future outlook. However, at the 
same time the majority of companies posted a more positive outlook than for the previous year. 
Since a more positive outlook and a negative external environment are, to some extent, in contradic-
tion with each other, it could be stated that companies now seem to use ‘economic uncertainty’ as a 
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disclaimer to safeguard the management in the case of lower than forecasted performance. This 
explanation would be in line with self-serving behavioral patterns observed frequently in other parts 
of the letter to shareholders as well. The trend of increasing carefulness in the future outlooks of 
companies is simultaneously very welcome, but also alarming in the sense that virtually all failures or 
other negative aspects can now be categorized under ‘economic uncertainty’, even when the root 
cause for them is clearly the management of the company instead of the external environment. 
In these subchapters of Chapter 5 I have gone through the overall style and tone of the letter to 
shareholders as well as the key discourses observed in them. In Chapter 5.7 I will summarize my main 
findings, discuss their significance and tie them to the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapters 
2 and 3. 
5.7 Summary 
In summary, the tone of the letters to shareholders was without exception positive, even throughout 
challenging economic cycles and changes in the CEO. There were roughly two categories of styles 
used in the letters: 1) ‘seemingly neutral’ and 2) marketing-oriented. The two style categories 
seemed to some extent be linked with the key discourses in the letters to shareholders in the sense 
that letters promoting the company’s services, customer satisfaction or corporate culture could be 
seen as more marketing-oriented, whereas letters presenting facts such as performance figures and 
market conditions could be characterized as ‘seemingly neutral’, even though they, too, consisted of 
several implicit, non-neutral messages. An interesting note was that during harder times (in 2008 and 
2009), the letters to shareholders were in general shorter than in better times. The tone was always 
positive as the result of the management’s discursive practice of creating a ‘reality’ in which the 
company is seen in a more positive light. 
In terms of the style of the letter, smaller companies (Stockmann, Nokian Tyres) had a more personal 
style with more colorful expressions and management’s own views about current and future perfor-
mance. This could be due to the phenomenon that smaller companies have lower hierarchies in their 
organizational structure, and the CEO is closer to the ‘ordinary people’ than in large international 
enterprises – which could reflect also on the style of the letter to shareholders. The style-tone matrix 
below summarizes the styles and tones of the companies studied, with a star marking a more per-
sonal style of communicating. 
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Figure 7: Style-tone matrix of companies studied 
Unsurprisingly, the letters to shareholders always contained the key discourses that are of signifi-
cance to the external audience: the company’s financial performance, the external operating envi-
ronment, future outlook for the next year and other non-recurring events from the current year. 
However, the thematic content of the studied letters to shareholders also contained some surprises. 
First of all, during the recession years of 2008 and 2009, Fortum dropped the growth discourse from 
their letters to shareholders, and in 2008 Kesko left out both growth and Russia, which were once 
again included in the following year. Fortum also provided the positive surprise regarding discourses 
in the letters to shareholders: in contrast to all other companies, they did not discuss streamlining 
their operations at all during the financial crisis.  
Once again, these phenomena may be tied to self-serving behavior in the sense that instead of dis-
closing negative news, companies opt for disclosing nothing at all. Judging purely by the thematic 
content, style and tone of the letters to shareholders, they may seem credible to the reader, but a 
closer (critical) analysis shows that their credibility is mostly only a discursive construct. Consistent 
with the style and tone of the letters, the discursive content, meaning leaving out negative discours-
es and focusing strictly on positive content can be seen as a manifestation of one key discursive prac-
tice – selective financial representation – in which the management seems to engage very often. 
Financial performance (and especially change therein) was the primary trigger as well as the main 
area in which the whole repertoire of impression management behavior – including self-serving at-
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tributions – was observed. The majority of the attributions observed were self-serving: with positive 
internal attributions taking first place and negative external attributions following suit. From non-
self-serving attributions, only positive external attributions were observed. The most attributional 
content (both self-serving and non-self-serving) as well as performance justification activities were 
shown by smaller companies with Nokian Tyres in the lead and Stockmann following second. One 
possible explanation is that smaller companies feel the need to justify their actions in more detail, 
whereas old, established and larger companies may regard their activities as ‘business as usual’, in-
stead focusing on new developments and external economic trends in their letters to shareholders. It 
could also be that larger companies are more subtle in their discourses (perhaps due to more experi-
ence in external communications), whereas smaller companies tend to express attributions more 
explicitly.  
As literature on self-serving attributions (see e.g. Staw et al. 1983, Aerts 2001 and Clatworthy & 
Jones 2003) states, successes were mostly attributed to a good corporate strategy and its implemen-
tation, investments or other management activities. Failures and performance declines, on the other 
hand, were mostly attributed to a difficult external environment. Respectively, in times of good per-
formance, positive internal attributions were the most common attributions; and in times of poor or 
declining performance, negative external attributions were the most common. Therefore, positive 
internal attributions were dominant in the 2007, 2010 and 2011 letters to shareholders, and negative 
external attributions in 2008 and 2009. Overall, positive internal attributions were more common 
than negative external attributions, which contributed to the positive overall tone of the letters. 
The growth and Russia discourses existed in conjunction with each other, and the pursuit of growth 
was never challenged: growth – and especially ‘profitable growth’ – seems to be an intrinsic value 
toward which companies should strive. Overall, the growth discourses seen in the letters to share-
holders aimed at answering two questions: the question of how the growth has been or will be 
achieved, and the question of where to pursue further growth opportunities. The answer to the lat-
ter question was more often than not Russia. The first question, on the other hand, was mostly an-
swered by organic growth and foreign direct investments into other countries, but a rising trend was 
to include acquisitions into the mix as well. The excessive amount of growth discourses as well as the 
interlinking of growth and Russia seems to be a self-serving discursive practice resulting from the 
management’s reaction to falling short of shareholder expectations. 
The most single discussed geographic market (apart from the companies’ domestic market) was Rus-
sia, which was presented mostly in a positive light and always in conjunction with current or future 
growth. Nokian Tyres had the largest number of Russia-related statements, which correlates with the 
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importance of Russia to the company’s sales: 26 % of revenues come from Russia – the highest num-
ber among the companies studied. Larimo & Huuhka (2007) found out that a long-term strategy was 
the most successful in terms of the Finnish companies’ activities in Russia, and the companies stud-
ied confirmed having such an approach. One problem is that even though growth discourses have 
revolved around Russia, actual bottom-line profits accrued in the market have been slim or even 
negative for most of the companies. Therefore, the common ‘profitable growth’ discourse shown in 
conjunction with Russia and growth discourses is problematic, since it is discussed virtually every 
year, but the profitability part never actualizes. A change in any other discourse, for example a nega-
tive change in performance or future outlook, instantly has an effect on other discourses in the sense 
that a negative change in performance usually triggers a change in future outlook, growth and Russia 
discourses. However, changes in profitability – for better or for worse – do not seem to affect any of 
the other discourses. Therefore, it is likely that the taken-for-granted pursuit for ‘profitable growth’ is 
merely a social construct, with companies pursuing the latter and ignoring the former. 
Only few mentions of challenges in Russia were found in the letters to shareholders, and most of 
them revolved around the fact that development in the Russian economy is highly dependent on the 
price of oil. Contrary to my expectations, only one company, Stockmann, mentioned actual problems 
in Russia. Engaging in self-defeating discourses, in which problems in a target market are explicitly 
communicated, was not consistent with the discursive practices of any other company, and also con-
tradicted previous research. Therefore, the motives for this kind of discursive practice have to lie 
elsewhere. It is likely that Stockmann, mentioning the problems experienced with the rule of law in 
Russia, was trying to influence at least the atmosphere in Russia – if not even the verdict of the Rus-
sian court. 
The future outlook discourses of companies varied in the sense that smaller companies (Nokian Tyres 
and Stockmann) were clear leaders in terms of quality and quantity, by providing rich descriptions of 
their future outlooks complete with the management’s own views, and larger companies sticking to a 
more ‘factual’ description current figures or even opting not to give any outlook – which was seen 
especially in times of uncertainty, in 2008 and 2009. Future outlooks given were mostly positive even 
across economic cycles – and neutral at minimum, with the exception of Stockmann issuing a nega-
tive future outlook in 2008. The future outlooks of the companies showed, how quickly the financial 
crisis started and how top managers did not see it coming: in 2007 all companies were anticipating to 
break their current year’s record performance, but starting from 2008 the future outlooks given were 
neutral and more careful. As a result, the future outlooks of companies after 2008 have become less 
informative from the reader’s point of view with their careful and vague statements. 
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I have captured my perception of relations between the key discourses found in the letters to share-
holders for both the past year as well as the future in the model below, which I call the diamond 
model of growth discourse. The model shows the interdependency of the ‘growth’ discourse with the 
discourses of Russia, financial performance and the future outlook in the sense that change in one of 
the discourses will trigger a change in the others to at least a small degree. In addition, the model 
also illustrates how profitability is only loosely, if all, linked to all the other discourses, meaning that 
despite frequent observations of ‘profitable growth’ in the companies’ discourses, profitability does 
not, in fact, seem to have a role to play in growth discourse. Changes in profitability, for better or for 
worse, did not trigger any changes in other discourses – and, as a result, the ‘profitability’ component 
in growth discourse would seem to be only cosmetic. This result contradicts Penrose’s (1959) theory, 
in which ‘growth’ and ‘profits’ as the goal of the company’s investment programs can be used synon-
ymously. However, I find it highly unlikely that the contradiction would exist in the actual level, since 
companies will not deliberately engage in investments that will generate negative profits. Therefore, 
the contradiction needs to exist on the discursive level in the sense that the companies’ discourses 
reflect a more positive view of the company’s actions than the ‘reality’ shows. Therefore, the ‘profit-
able growth’ strategy and discourses related to it seen very often in the letters to shareholders can 
and should be challenged.  
 
Figure 8: Diamond model of growth discourse 
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I set out to study the question of how Finnish companies justified and legitimized seek-
ing growth in Russia, and how they then communicated their performance and future outlook there-
in. In order to find the answer to this key question, I applied a critical discourse analysis methodology 
to five CEO’s letters to shareholders (2007 to 2011) of five large Finnish companies that have estab-
lished operations in Russia. In essence, I was able to find answers to the main research question and 
contrast the discursive practices seen in companies’ letters to shareholders with the theories of such 
behavior.  
The main research question was divided into three sub-questions, which helped to form the overall 
answer to the main interest of this thesis. Similarly to the main question, I was able to find satisfying 
answers to all of the three sub-questions, which have been listed below. 
1. How is the expansion to Russia explained and legitimized?  
2. How do companies justify their performance in their annual report?  
3. How do companies reflect on their future outlook? 
To set the theoretical context for my research, I have presented the theories for studying corporate 
texts as well as the specific example of seeking growth in Russia from both a theoretical and discur-
sive point of view, underlining the characteristics of the Russian business environment. Since my 
research consisted of a critical discourse analysis of CEO’s letters to shareholders as corporate texts, I 
dedicated Chapter 3 to the critical discourse analysis framework in general. Then, I presented the 
methodology adopted in this thesis and continued to the findings from my research. In this chapter, I 
will conclude as well as contrast them with the literature presented in earlier chapters. In the end, I 
will present directions for further research. 
According to the theory of impression management presented in Chapter 2.1.3, top management has 
incentives to represent their company in the best possible light (Clatworthy & Jones 2003), which 
may manifest itself as selective financial representation (Aerts 2005), self-serving attributions (Tessa-
rolo et al. 2010), an emphasis on positive over negative content (Staw et al. 1983) or using more pos-
itive than negative expressions (Rutherford 2005). The impression management view suggests that 
company management monitors the environment for cues that may trigger a change in the way in 
which the external audience views their company (Aerts 2001), and then reacts to this using various 
methods of impression management behavior. This thesis also took into account attributions as a 
method in the ‘impression management toolkit’, and analyzed the functioning of attributions in an 
impression management mode – as fulfilling the management’s self-serving agenda.  
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As said, the overly positive tone of the letters results from the management’s use of language in a 
self-serving manner to create a more ‘positive discursive reality’ surrounding the company, which 
manifests itself as a large amount of impression management behavior, such as attributions, found in 
the letters to shareholders – a finding which would be consistent with previous literature on letters 
to shareholders (see e.g. Aerts 2001, Clatworthy & Jones 2003). It was interesting to see that during 
harder times (in 2008 and 2009) the letters to shareholders were in general shorter than in better 
economic conditions, which is consistent with the findings of Staw et al. (1983), in which positive 
content is emphasized over negative as well as the theory of selective representation brought for-
ward by Aerts (2005). Indeed, in most cases, if the management had nothing positive to say, they 
opted to say nothing at all – a phenomenon, which was also observed in Tessarolo et al. (2010). 
Aligned with this kind of self-serving behavior, companies also left out the discourses of growth and 
Russia in times of challenging economic conditions. 
In line with the conclusion of Aerts (2001), the company’s financial performance was the main trigger 
as well as the area in which the whole repertoire of impression management behavior was observed. 
However, contrary to Aerts’ (2001) results, negative performance was not the primary trigger for 
self-serving attributional behavior – instead, a change in the company’s performance (both positive 
and negative) served as the primary cue, with positive changes in performance contributing to the 
majority. Only YIT seemed to conform to the results of Aerts (2001) in their attributional statements.  
All in all the findings from this thesis in regards to performance discourses were aligned with previ-
ous research on the accounting discourses in annual reports (such as the CEO’s letter to sharehold-
ers) in the sense that the self-serving tendency to take credit for positive results and avoid blame for 
negative effects was observed in the vast majority of the analyzed material, as was the case in Staw 
et al. (1983), Aerts (2001, 2005), Clatworthy & Jones (2003) and Tessarolo et al. (2010). The self-
serving attributional content of the letter to shareholders also showed that positive internal attribu-
tions were significantly more common than negative external attributions, which was among the 
main findings in Staw et al. (1983), Aerts (2001, 2005), Clatworthy & Jones (2003) and Tessarolo et al. 
(2010). 
Even though Clatworthy & Jones (2003) noted that companies in general tend to avoid explicit causal 
attributions, more explicit than implicit causal attributions were observed in the letters to sharehold-
ers studied, with positive internal attributions accounting for the majority and negative external at-
tributions following second. Based especially on the performance-related discourses, it would seem 
that the management’s self-serving agenda is visible for anyone to see – even without studying the 
texts through a critical lens. Considering the alarmingly large amount of self-serving attributional 
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content in the letters to shareholders, I will have to side with Clatworthy & Jones (2003) in their re-
quest for a more formal code of conduct or even an auditing process for the accounting discourses in 
annual reports. It would seem that top management, feeling the pressure of shareholders’ expecta-
tions and having the incentives to do so, will without hesitation engage in self-serving behavior – as 
was suggested by Core (2001). In essence, this finding is aligned with previous research regarding the 
motives behind self-serving behavior (see e.g. Staw et al. 1983, Aerts 2005) by providing strong evi-
dence for the motivational explanation. 
However, a rational explanation would suggest that both positive and negative outcomes occur as a 
sum of hundreds of small and large factors, which is why attributing them to a single event or activity 
is dangerous. Whether or not these attributions arise due to a cognitive bias in recalling past events 
or a deliberate attempt to construct a more positive corporate image (as Staw et al. 1983, Clatworthy 
& Jones 2003 and Aerts 2005 concluded) remains unclear and could be a possible topic for further 
research. But, in the spirit of critical discourse analysis, a more credible explanation for the abun-
dance of self-serving behavior observed in the letters to shareholders is the management’s tension in 
which they feel the pressure of shareholders’ expectations and, at the same time, fall short of these 
expectations in their actual performance. Therefore, in order to protect the readers of the letters to 
shareholders, I would propose that accounting discourses would in the future be regulated with an 
official code of conduct or auditing process. After such regulation, the discourses would not provide 
such an interesting research topic, but they would be more transparent and reliable. 
The excessive amount of growth discourses in general as well as presenting Russia-discourses con-
stantly in conjunction with growth discourses seems to be a self-serving discursive practice resulting 
from the management’s reaction to falling short of shareholders’ expectations of growth, as was 
suggested by Staw et al. (1983). Indeed, when looking at the companies’ actual performance in Rus-
sia, it is striking to find that companies indeed tend to fall short of their growth targets. Therefore, 
there seems to be a contradiction between the growth in Russia discourses of companies and their 
actual performance as well as their strategies for ‘profitable growth’, and the whole pursuit of 
growth in Russia should be challenged.  
 
In a similar manner, it would seem that, for the companies studied, the term of ‘profitable growth’ is 
an oxymoron in the sense that the appearance of one of the words overrides the possibility for the 
other to exist. A five-year period should be long enough for showing positive results with a ‘profita-
ble growth’ strategy – even in Russia –, but none of the companies have seemed to achieve this goal 
– and as a result resorted to impression management behaviors to cover up for it. Essentially, this 
contradicts Penrose’s (1959) theory, in which she argues that both ‘profits’ and ‘growth’ can be used 
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interchangeably when discussing the goals of a company’s investments. Evidence shows, that this 
holds true on the discursive level, but in the ‘real’ actions of companies, especially in Russia, these 
two seem to be mutually exclusive. 
 
In line with the generally positive tone of the letters to shareholders, also the future outlooks given 
were in general positive. However, consistently with the theory of selective financial representation 
(Aerts 2005), some companies decided not to issue an outlook at all in 2008 instead of issuing a neg-
ative future outlook. This is also aligned with the self-serving behavior of focusing on positive content 
over negative discussed by Staw et al. (1983) and found earlier in this thesis in conjunction with per-
formance discourses. An interesting finding in regards to the future outlooks was the finding of how 
abruptly the financial crisis came, and how it took top managers by surprise. In 2007 all companies 
were predicting for another record year in terms of performance, but starting from 2008 their future 
outlooks were more neutral and careful. In essence, companies started to avoid giving too optimistic 
future outlooks, by expressing the careful outlook as the result of ‘economic uncertainty’. This be-
havioral pattern can also be considered self-serving in the sense that giving an overly positive future 
outlook and falling significantly behind it would cause blame towards the management, which they 
avoid by posting a more cautious future outlook – and if the actual performance would exceed the 
careful future outlook given, the ‘success’ can then be attributed to the management’s own actions. 
 
While it is true that the economic cycles have shortened and times turned more turbulent, the effect 
of the surprisingly strong downturn in 2008 can still be seen in the future outlooks of companies. In 
2011, all companies included an element of uncertainty in their future outlook. However, at the 
same time the majority of companies posted a more positive outlook than for the previous year. 
Since a more positive outlook and a negative external environment are, to some extent, in contradic-
tion with each other, it would seem that companies now seem to use ‘economic uncertainty’ as a 
disclaimer to safeguard the management in the case of lower than forecasted performance. This 
explanation would be in line with self-serving behavioral patterns observed frequently in other parts 
of the letter to shareholders as well. The trend of increasing carefulness in the future outlooks of 
companies is simultaneously very welcome, but also alarming in the sense that virtually all failures or 
other negative aspects can now be categorized under ‘economic uncertainty’ – or attributed to the 
financial crisis as was the case in the letters studied, even if the root cause for them were clearly the 
management of the company instead of the external environment. 
 
In this thesis, I was able find interesting results to the main research the question of how companies 
seeking growth in Russia justified and legitimized seeking growth in Russia, and how they then com-
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municated their performance and future outlook therein.  Nevertheless, further research into the 
topic is still needed for digging deeper into the reasons and causalities behind these observations. 
First, one possible direction to which this study can easily be extended would be backing the study up 
with a quantitative analysis on the financial figures reported by the companies in the years studied. 
This would help in forming a more in-depth understanding on whether and when a contradiction 
exists between the accounting figures reported by the company and the letters to shareholders in 
which these figures are explained, and which factors in the figures usually trigger the management to 
form such a contradiction. Another direction, to which this study could be extended, is complement-
ing the critical discourse analysis conducted in this thesis with qualitative open-ended interviews 
with the CEOs of the studied companies in order to find out how they ended up communicating in 
the ways seen in this study, and how they see the possible contradiction between their actual finan-
cial results and discourses about them. The two directions for extending this study – and other simi-
lar endeavors – are not mutually exclusive, but to conduct all three in the same paper requires a sig-
nificant amount of time and effort, and would probably be more suitable for a doctoral thesis or a 
series of research papers than one single master’s thesis.  
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Appendix 
Table of letters to shareholders read for the empirical research 
Company Annual 
report 
Letter to shareholders 
 
CEO 
Fortum 2007 President and CEO’s Review Mikael Lilius 
2008 Interview with the President and CEO Mikael Lilius 
2009 Interview with the President and CEO Tapio Kuula 
2010 Interview with the President and CEO Tapio Kuula 
2011 Interview with the President and CEO Tapio Kuula 
Kesko 2007 Review by the President and CEO Matti Halmesmäki 
2008 Review by the President and CEO Matti Halmesmäki 
2009 Review by the President and CEO Matti Halmesmäki 
2010 Review by the President and CEO Matti Halmesmäki 
2011 Review by the President and CEO Matti Halmesmäki 
Nokian Tyres 2007 Letter from the President Kim Gran 
2008 Letter from the President Kim Gran 
2009 Letter from the President and CEO Kim Gran 
2010 Letter from the President and CEO Kim Gran 
2011 Letter from the President and CEO Kim Gran 
Stockmann 2007 CEO’s review Hannu Penttilä 
2008 CEO’s review Hannu Penttilä 
2009 CEO’s review Hannu Penttilä 
2010 CEO’s review Hannu Penttilä 
2011 CEO’s review Hannu Penttilä 
YIT 2007 President and CEO’s Review Hannu Leinonen 
2008 President and CEO’s Review Juhani Pitkäkoski 
2009 President and CEO’s Review Juhani Pitkäkoski 
2010 President and CEO’s Review Juhani Pitkäkoski 
2011 President and CEO’s Review Juhani Pitkäkoski 
Table 2: List of letters to shareholders studied 
 
